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Abstract We develop a formal semantic analysis of the alarm calls used by
Campbell’s monkeys in the Tai forest (Ivory Coast) and on Tiwai island (Sierra
Leone)—two sites that differ in the main predators that the monkeys are exposed to
(eagles on Tiwai vs. eagles and leopards in Tai). Building on data discussed in
Ouattara et al. (PLoS ONE 4(11):e7808, 2009a; PNAS 106(51): 22026–22031,
2009b) and Arnold et al. (Population differences in wild Campbell’s monkeys alarm
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call use, 2013), we argue that on both sites alarm calls include the roots krak and
hok, which can optionally be affixed with -oo, a kind of attenuating suffix; in
addition, sentences can start with boom boom, which indicates that the context is not
one of predation. In line with Arnold et al., we show that the meaning of the roots is
not quite the same in Tai and on Tiwai: krak often functions as a leopard alarm call
in Tai, but as a general alarm call on Tiwai. We develop models based on a
compositional semantics in which concatenation is interpreted as conjunction, roots
have lexical meanings, -oo is an attenuating suffix, and an all-purpose alarm
parameter is raised with each individual call. The first model accounts for the
difference between Tai and Tiwai by way of different lexical entries for krak.
The second model gives the same underspecified entry to krak in both locations
(= general alarm call), but it makes use of a competition mechanism akin to scalar
implicatures. In Tai, strengthening yields a meaning equivalent to non-aerial dan-
gerous predator and turns out to single out leopards. On Tiwai, strengthening yields
a nearly contradictory meaning due to the absence of ground predators, and only the
unstrengthened meaning is used.
Keywords Primate linguistics  Primate semantics  Alarm calls 
Primate communication
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We develop a formal semantic analysis of the alarm calls of male Campbell’s
monkeys, a species of Old World monkeys (specifically, of cercopitheci) which is
doubly interesting for linguists. First, as shown in detail by Ouattara et al. (2009a,
b), these alarm calls appear to include meaningful roots, a suffix, and possibly a
non-trivial syntax. Second, as investigated by Arnold et al. (2013), environmental
differences give rise to a small but significant dialectal difference between the call
systems found at two sites, the Tai forest in Ivory Coast, and Tiwai island in Sierra
Leone (they primarily differ in that leopards are present in Tai and absent from
Tiwai). We sketch and compare two models of the commonalities and differences
between these call systems. One model posits a real dialectal difference in the
lexical meaning (and thus in the cognitive representation) of one call, krak, used as a
leopard alarm in Tai but as a general alarm on Tiwai.1 The other model assigns a
single, innate meaning of general alarm to krak, but relies on a rule of
strengthening—akin to scalar implicatures—to derive a ‘ground predator’ meaning;
for lack of such predators on Tiwai, the rule simply fails to be applied. In this
second analysis, we don’t have different dialects in a technical sense, but the
underlying semantic system is far more complex than is standardly expected for
monkey calls.
In what follows, we freely apply linguistic terminology to these calls, with the
belief that they can and should be studied as formal languages with a sound
system, a lexicon, a morphology, a syntax, a semantics, and a pragmatics.
Importantly, we do not take a stand on the relation that these systems bear to
human language; to say that they can be studied as formal systems does not imply
that they share non-trivial properties with human language, nor that they share an
evolutionary origin with it. In fact, call systems that have properties reminiscent
of those we study here were described in Madagascar lemurs, which are
phylogenetically extremely distant from Campbells’s monkeys, and also from
humans, as seen in (1) (their most recent, common ancestor with either species
lived approximately 76–99 million years ago (Perelman et al. 2011); for
comparison, humans and chimpanzees have a most recent common ancestor that
lived approximately 6–7 million years ago, while humans and Campbell’s
monkeys have a most recent common ancestor that lived 20–38 million years
ago). We do believe, however, that any comparison between human language and
alarm calls will be illuminated by a precise formal analysis of the latter.
1 In the title of this paper, we use the term ‘dialects’ informally, to refer to apparent differences between
two closely related linguistic-like systems—with no implication that these differences are major (since we
only consider differences in the use of a single call, krak). When we talk here of a ‘real dialectal
difference’ between Tai and Tiwai Campbell’s monkeys, we refer to distinct cognitive representations
between the Tai and Tiwai calls (in our case, distinct representations at the semantic level). This
terminological point is taken up again in the last lines of Sect. 3.3.
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(1) Primate phylogeny
One cautionary note is in order before we start. In a strict sense, a semantic rule
requires relatively little: a relation of denotation or satisfaction between primitive
objects of a (usually discrete) system and parts of the world (e.g. objects or
situations); and a way to extend this relation to a language obtained by combining
these primitive objects into sequences. If the final relation is based on truth (yielding
statements such as situation w satisfies sentence S if and only if ____), one can
further posit that users of this system may have at their disposal a relation of
entailment, with the condition that sentence S entails sentence S’ if and only if every
situation that makes S true makes S’ true. Nothing in the definition of a semantic
rule, or even of entailment, requires a high degree of rationality, let alone a theory of
mind. In fact, even parts of pragmatics can be developed with relatively little
machinery. For instance, in their simplest version scalar implicatures only require
that subjects have at their disposal (i) a notion of satisfaction (to determine whether
a sentence S—e.g. p or q—is compatible with the situation at hand); (ii) a notion of
scalar alternatives (to determine whether the sentence S’ (e.g. p and q) competes
with the sentence S); and (iii) a notion of entailment (to determine whether S’ is
more informative than S). These three ingredients could suffice to yield the
inference that if p or q was uttered, the more informative statement p and q is false.
When one considers other parts of pragmatics, such as presupposition theory, things
might be rather different. Presuppositions are often analyzed in terms of common
belief (e.g. Stalnaker 2002). If so, in order to determine whether a presupposition is
or isn’t satisfied, one needs to determine whether it is compatible with what is
common belief in the conversation, which presumably requires an ability to
represent another person’s beliefs, and to compute complex notions on that basis.
442 P. Schlenker et al.
123
Importantly, in the present piece we will only use tools from elementary semantics
and (in our second model) of simple implicature theory. Thus even if the most
sophisticated of our models is correct, this piece will have few implications about
the reasoning abilities of Campbell’s monkeys.
1 Introduction to call semantics
1.1 General issues
Like many other mammals and birds, some primates produce vocalizations when
exposed to predators (as well as to other disturbances). From a semantic perspective,
these raise several questions.
(i) Function: Do the calls communicate informational content to conspecifics?
Often, calls have a dual function: to alert—and thus communicate infor-
mation to—conspecifics, but also to deter a predator, for instance by let-
ting it know that it has been detected (e.g. Caro 2005).
(ii) Content: When calls communicate information to conspecifics, what is their
semantic content? One important distinction is whether calls directly enc-
ode information about a predator type, or information about properties of
the threat (level, directional origin, etc.), or a combination of both. In the
first case (information about predator types), ethologists often say that the
calls are ‘referential’.2
Summarizing recent research, Ca¨sar et al. (2012) write:
… it is not clear whether primates intend to produce calls that refer to
specific external events, or whether they merely respond to ‘‘evolutionarily
important’’ events that place them into different motivations. One way to
address this has been by investigating whether associated variables, such as
the level of threat experienced by the caller, can explain the caller’s
behaviour better than the predatory category (e.g., California ground
squirrels: Owings and Virginia 1978). In some other species, it has been
argued that alarm calls refer to both the level and type of threat (Manser
2001/2002; Templeton et al. 2005; Sieving et al. 2010). Chickadees (Poecile
atricapilla), for instance, produce ‘‘seet’’ alarm call in response to flying
raptors and a ‘‘chick-a-dee’’ alarm call in response to perched or stationary
raptors, but their calls also provide information about the threat level
(Templeton et al. 2005). Within the primate lineage, the predator type
appears to have an overriding influence on alarm calling behaviour, with
little evidence that variation in distance or direction has a major impact
2 This need not imply that such calls are referential in the semanticist’s sense, i.e. that they are
‘expressions of type e’ within a type-theoretic system. In fact, given that calls appear to convey
information on their own, it is rather natural to give them a propositional semantics (= ‘type t’)—which is
the line we will take in our analysis of Campbell’s calls.
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(e.g., vervet monkeys: Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; Diana monkeys:
Zuberbu¨hler 2000).
(iii) Organization: What is it in calls that carries information to conspecifics
(when such information is conveyed)? As Ca¨sar et al. (2012) write in their
initial summary:
some species produce several acoustically distinct alarm calls in response
to different predator types (Seyfarth et al. 1980a, b; Manser 2001/2002;
Templeton et al. 2005), but in others, the nature of the danger encountered
is reflected by the number of calls per sequence (Schel et al. 2009), the rate
of call delivery (Lemasson et al. 2010), the intensity of calls (Blumstein
1999), or by combinations of calls (Arnold and Zuberbu¨hler 2006a, b).
As with other semantic systems, it is natural to ask which lexical meanings
(if any) are available at the level of individual calls, and then what are the
rules of combination by which sequences can be interpreted (if indeed these
sequences have a compositional-like structure; otherwise, meanings for
entire sequences might have to be stored as if they were lexical meanings).
(iv) Development and variation: How do the form and meaning of calls develop,
both at the level of individual calls and of sequences? While some aspects
of calls might be innate, some might have to be acquired. Among the latter,
it would be particularly interesting to determine whether different groups
of the same biological species can display dialectal differences in terms of
forms, meanings, or both.
Before we come to Campbell’s monkeys, it will be helpful to see how some
of these questions were addressed for other primate species. In the rest of this
introduction, we summarize some results that will bear on the present study. In
a nutshell:
– Seyfarth et al.’s pioneering study (1980a, b) of alarm calls in vervet monkeys
defined the main questions and established the methodology, based on field
experiments (see also Struhsaker 1967). They showed that vervet monkeys
produce different calls in reaction to the putative presence of eagles, snakes and
leopards, and studied the ontogenetic development of these calls.
– Fichtel and Kappeler (2002) showed that two species of Madagascar lemurs
(redfronted lemurs and white sifakas) (i) ‘‘gave specific alarm calls exclusively
towards raptors’’, whereas (ii) ‘‘terrestrial alarm calls were also given in other contexts
associated with high arousal’’ (e.g. group encounters). Despite the phylogenetic
distance between lemurs and cercopitheci, in our final analysis of Campbell’s calls we
will come to a rather similar conclusion, with a specific raptor alarm call and a general
alarm call—a pattern which, according to Wheeler and Fischer (2012), is found across
several primate species (we come back to this issue in Sect. 1.3).
– Stephan and Zuberbu¨hler (2008) studied another family of cercopitheci, Diana
monkeys, which also exist in the Tai forest and on Tiwai island, and are relatively
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closely related to Campbell’s monkeys. They showed that sequence length (i)
could carry information about the threats, and (ii) sometimes differed across Tiwai
and Tai; but they did not claim that this was a bona fide dialectal difference.
– Arnold and Zuberbu¨hler (2008, 2012) studied the calls of putty-nosed monkeys
(a species of cercopitheci less closely related to Campbell’s monkeys than Diana
monkeys are), and concluded that they use call combinations to convey
information that is distinct from that of the individual calls. Importantly, they
found no evidence of a compositional system, and argued instead that complex
calls should be analyzed as some kinds of ‘idioms’.
1.2 Vervet monkeys and ‘referential’ calls (Seyfarth et al. 1980a, b)
In their pioneering study of monkey alarm calls, Seyfarth et al. (1980a, b) showed that
vervet monkeys use three alarm calls that carry information about the presence of
eagles, snakes and leopards respectively; they investigated the production of these
calls when different threats naturally arise, and they assessed the monkeys’ reactions
by way of playback experiments. They further investigated the development of these
calls from infants to adults, and showed that ‘‘as infants grow older they sharpen the
association between predator species and the type of alarm call’’ (the development of
this call system was investigated in greater detail in Seyfarth and Cheney 1986); the
more discriminating calling behavior of adults compared to juveniles and infants is
depicted in (2).
(2) Seyfarth et al. (1980a) on the development of vervet monkey calling behavior
Fig. 1 Eagle alarms given by adult, juvenile, and infant monkeys to different species or objects. Broken
line 1–5 alarms, single line 6–10 alarms, double line 11–15 alarms, solid line more than 15 alarms. Data
on 149 alarms were collected over 14 months from 31 adults, 16 juveniles, and 17 infants
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Importantly, Seyfarth et al. (1980a, b) did not decisively distinguish between
three possible interpretations of their data. One involves semantic development, in
the sense that vervet monkeys gradually acquire a more refined meaning for the
relevant alarm calls as they get more exposure to their use by conspecifics—which
in principle might allow for dialectal variation as well. A second interpretation
pertains to pragmatic development instead: the meaning of the calls might remain
constant throughout the vervet monkey’s life, but as a monkey becomes more
mature it might learn than only some events are worth talking about. On this view,
what the researchers labeled as an ‘eagle’ alarm call might in fact be a bird alarm
call (as in the infants’ use); but as they grow older, the monkeys might gradually
realize that only dangerous birds are worth calling to. A third possibility pertains to
cognitive development: as a referee suggests, the monkeys might just get better at
categorizing other animals over time.
A further issue, which will matter in the present study, is whether the development of
the call system of vervet monkeys involves learning. Seyfarth and Cheney (1986)
emphasize that they do not have conclusive evidence that it does, but they provide
suggestive arguments. As they write, ‘‘after an infant has given an eagle alarm call to a
genuine predator, adults are significantly more likely to alarm-call themselves than when
the infant alarm-calls at a non-predator’’—which might suggest that there exists a
mechanism of positive reinforcement; and similarly, ‘‘when infants respond to the
playback of an alarm call, they are significantly more likely to do so correctly if they have
first looked at an adult’’. Importantly, even if learning is involved, these observations do
not help decide whether it is of a semantic, pragmatic or cognitive nature.
1.3 General versus predator-specific calls (Wheeler and Fischer 2012; Fichtel
and Kappeler 2002)
While alarm calls are found across primate species, Wheeler and Fischer (2012) note an
interesting trend that will be of some importance in our final analysis of Campbell’s
monkey calls. As they write, ‘‘across species it tends to be the call associated with
terrestrial predators that is given in other contexts, whereas the call associated with aerial
predators tends to be context-specific and meet the criteria of functional reference’’
(Wheeler and Fischer 2012, p. 200); they cite examples from capuchin monkeys and
tamarins (New World monkeys), and lemurs (as noted above, this pattern was found by
Fichtel and Kappeler redfronted lemurs and white sifakas). Initially, the data from
Campbell’s monkeys (Old World monkeys) appear to be quite different: in data from the
Tai forest, the leopard call and the eagle call appear to play symmetric roles; but in our
final analysis, we will argue that the leopard call is in fact a general alarm call, which falls
under the broad generalization discussed by Wheeler and Fischer and illustrated in lemurs.
1.4 Diana monkeys, sequence length and dialectal variation
(Stephan and Zuberbu¨hler 2008)
It has been noted for several monkey species that the number of calls per series, or
the call rate, seem to carry meaning (in fact, call rate appears to carry information in
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Campbell’s monkeys, a point to which we return below). Stephan and Zuberbu¨hler
(2008) study a difference in calling behavior between male Diana monkeys of the
Tai forest (Ivory Coast) and their male cousins from Tiwai island (Sierra Leone). In
Tai, Diana monkeys have two primary predators besides humans and chimpanzees:
leopards and crowned eagles. By contrast, on Tiwai island ‘‘leopards have not been
reported for at least 30 years’’ (Stephan and Zuberbu¨hler 2008), hence since the late
1970s—which leaves crowned eagles as the main predator.3
Stephan and Zuberbu¨hler studied the calling behavior of male Diana monkeys of
the two sites in field experiments in which they played (i) Diana eagle calls (= DE);
(ii) Diana leopard calls (= DL); (iii) eagle shrieks (= E); (iv) leopard growls (= L).
In cases (i) and (iii), male Diana monkeys reacted with eagle calls; in cases (ii) and
(iv), they produced leopard calls. But Stephan and Zuberbu¨hler found interesting
patterns of variation in the lengths of the sequences produced across the two sites.
(3) Differential calling behavior of Diana monkeys in the Tai forest and
on Tiwai island
Fig. 2 Median numbers of calls per sequence of Tai‹ (hatched boxes) and Tiwai (open boxes) Diana
monkeys to playbacks of eagle shrieks (E), leopard growls (L), male Diana alarm calls to eagles (DE) and
male Diana alarm calls to leopards (DL). Box plots show median values, quartiles, range and outliers.
Circles and asterisks show extreme values, asterisks being more extreme. (Figure re-drawn from Stephan
and Zuberbu¨hler 2008, Figure 2)
3 Humans and chimpanzees do prey on monkeys, but are usually believed not to give rise to alarm calls
because they are pursuit hunters (hence calling to them would only help them locate their victims).
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As shown in (3), the median numbers of calls were approximately the same across
the two sites in eagle-related situations. But in leopard-related situations, this was
not so. Crucially, the authors found that ‘‘at Tai, males discriminate acoustically
between their responses to leopards and general disturbances, such as falling trees or
fleeing duikers (Zuberbu¨hler et al. 1997), whereas at Tiwai, males also responded
regularly to such general disturbances, but these call sequences were not different
from the ones given to leopard-related stimuli (…)’’.
Importantly, these findings can be interpreted in two ways. First, there could be a
difference in the meaning of the length of call sequences—and thus a difference in the
(ill-understood!) semantics of the relevant call systems. Alternatively, it could be that
the two call systems have exactly the same semantics, and that the differential calling
behavior across the two sites just reflects a cognitive difference in world knowledge on
the part of the language users. This is a particularly natural interpretation because the
difference observed solely concerns leopards, which are familiar to the Tai monkeys
but not to their cousins from Tiwai. Thus Tiwai Diana males might call to leopard
growls in the same way as to general alarms because they just don’t know what kind of
threat they are; nothing follows about the semantic properties of the call system. To
have a bona fide argument for a semantic difference, one should display a case in
which a stimulus that plausibly corresponds to the same life experience across the two
sites gives rise to a differential calling behavior; we do not have this for Diana
monkeys—but we will for Campbell’s monkeys.
1.5 Putty-nosed monkeys and call combination
Arnold and Zuberbu¨hler (2006a, b, 2008, 2012, 2013) investigated an interesting
instance of call combination. Male putty-nosed monkeys have three elementary loud
calls, pyows, hacks, and booms. Focusing on the first two,4 Arnold and Zuberbu¨hler
argued in their initial studies that the simulated presence of crowned eagles
triggered series of hacks or series of hacks followed by series of pyows
(= ‘transitional series’); while the simulated presence of leopards triggered series
of pyows. In Arnold and Zuberbu¨hler (2013), however, hack/transitional series were
recorded not just in eagle contexts, but ‘‘at least equally often in a variety of other
contexts as well, including to nonpredatory disturbances and the calls of
neighboring males’’, while pyow series ‘‘were given in an even wider range of
contexts, (…) and most often without any apparent cause at all’’. So the precise
function of the two calls is still a matter of debate.5 But the remarkable finding in
Arnold and Zuberbu¨hler (2006a, b, 2008, 2012) was that alternating series of 1–4
pyows followed by 1–4 hacks regularly instigated group movement, both in
4 Booms ‘‘are very rarely heard and occur in a wide range of contexts’’ (Arnold et al. 2011); they play no
role in Arnold and Zuberbu¨hler’s analysis of hacks and pyows.
5 In Arnold and Zuberbu¨hler’s current assessment, pyows are multifunctional, attention-getting calls, and
hacks are alarm calls.
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predatory and non-predatory contexts. In this case, two call types can be combined
to form a third one, but unlike what is usually found in human language, there is no
evidence that the combination is compositional: the meaning of the alternating
sequences cannot currently be derived from the individual meanings assigned to
each call; for this reason, Arnold and Zuberbu¨hler argued that this was a case of
syntactic combination without semantic composition.
1.6 The importance of Campbell’s monkey calls
The research summarized above has left several questions open.
(i) Structure: Do some systems of primate alarm calls have a non-trivial
syntactic and/or semantic structure? In particular, is it possible to discern
some version of a compositional system, as is found in human language—
in other words, can we find cases in which different syntactic rules are
associated with different ways to combine meanings?
(ii) Variation: Are these systems of calls entirely innate, or are they in part
learned? In the latter case, is it possible to find dialectal differences in the
alarm calls of different groups of the same species of primates?
(iii) Methodology: On a methodological level, can one construct insightful
formal models of the syntax, semantics and possibly pragmatics of these
alarm calls? The question is of course particularly relevant to the extent
that one has found non-trivial properties that can benefit from a formal
approach.
The first question, pertaining to structure, was addressed in Ouattara et al. (2009a,
b), who made two key discoveries on the alarm calls of male Campbell’s monkeys
(note that females have calls as well, but they are different from those of males and
considerably less loud—which makes them harder to study; males start uttering
‘male’ alarm calls around adolescence).
– First, Campbell’s monkey alarm calls have a root-suffix morphological
structure: a suffix -oo can be added to the roots krak, hok and wak to yield
krak-oo, hok-oo, and wak-oo (the root wak was not found on its own in the
limited data they discussed, but it is in the more recent ones we discuss below).
– Second, Campbell’s monkey calls involve at least one apparently syntactic rule: a
particular call, boom, produced by filling air sacs, is usually found at the beginning
of sequences only, and is usually reduplicated.6 Furthermore, it seems to radically
6 Two remarks should be added.
– In the data discussed by Ouattara et al. (2009b), the effect seems to be categorical: boom boom only
occurs at the beginning of sequences. In the richer set of data we have access to, the effect is more
gradient; we come back to this point in Sect. 2.3.
– There could be physiological reasons that explain the syntactic distribution and/or the function of air
sacs (for instance because both time and energy are required to fill air sacs); we leave this issue for
future research.
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modify their meanings: a sequence that causes other monkeys to be alert to the
presence of predators loses this effect when it is prefixed with boom boom.7
A version of the second question, pertaining to variation, was addressed in some
detail in the literature on bird song syntax (see for instance Lachlan 2006 for a review).
For primate alarm calls, there are a few (occasionally anecdotal) reports of possible
dialectal differences in call repertoires or realization.8 We will not have anything to
say about such differences; but we will claim that across Tai and Tiwai, Campbell’s
calls display dialectal variation in their semantics. Specifically, following Arnold et al.
(2013), and on the basis of new data collected by these authors’ teams, we will argue
that the semantics of a particular alarm call, krak, is not the same in the Tai forest and
on Tiwai island; as a first approximation, krak is often used as a leopard alarm call in
the Tai forest, while it is used as a general alarm call on Tiwai island.
Concerning the third question (= methodology), the literature on bird songs is
again quite a bit ahead of that on primate alarm calls: the formal properties of bird
song syntax have been investigated in some detail (see Berwick et al. 2011 for a
recent review). There is evidence of a sophisticated semantics in the alarm calls of
blackcapped chickadees, studied in Templeton et al. 2005; but to our knowledge
these have not given rise to formal semantic models. On the basis of a very simple
(and preliminary) morphological and syntactic analysis, we will provide formal
semantic models of Campbell’s calls, ones that account for the limited dialectal
variation that we find between the Tai forest and Tiwai island.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the main
morphological and syntactic properties, which are common to the two dialects (with
a simple root-suffix morphology, and a syntax that might be of a finite-state nature).
In Sect. 3, we analyze general properties of their semantics. We explain in Sect. 4
why there are two ‘dialects’ in a non-technical sense: the same word is used in
different ways on the two sites. In Sect. 5, we develop a simple formal model in
which the difference between the two dialects is located in the lexical semantics:
krak has a meaning of general alarm on Tiwai, but a meaning of leopard alarm in
7 In fact, the semantic effect of adding boom boom to a sequence is dramatic enough that another species
is cognizant of it. Specifically, Diana monkeys are sensitive to the presence or absence of boom boom at
the beginning of a Campbell’s call sequence (Zuberbu¨hler 2002).
8 Here are a few examples:
– Cheney and Seyfarth (1990, cited in Skyrms 1996), mention the replacement of loud alarm calls given
to dogs with shorter, quieter calls in vervet monkey populations that live in areas in which they are
hunted by armed humans.
– Ouattara et al. (2009b) discuss insertions of krak-oo after boom boom in one group of Tai Campbell’s
monkeys (group 1), but not in the other (group 2).
– Ouattara et al. (2009c) found that a certain variety of call (the ‘RRA2 call’) was present in captive
female Campbell’s monkeys but not in the wild, possibly suggesting the absence of this call from the
wild female repertoire. The authors mention the ‘controversial idea’ that the call in question ‘‘is a rare
example of a socially transmitted vocal innovation, similar to the pant hoot variants observed in
different chimpanzees (Marshall et al. 1999)’’ (they discuss further hypotheses as well).
– Marshall et al. (1999) discuss cases of dialectal variation in the acoustic realization of pant-hoot
vocalizations of captive chimpanzees (they also review instances of possible instances of dialectal
variation in other species, such as pygmy marmosets, red-chested moustached tamarins, and barbary
macaques).
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Tai. In Sect. 6, we explore an alternative analysis in which the meaning of the call is not
subject to lexical variation, but a pragmatic operation of strengthening (akin to scalar
implicatures) is responsible for the apparent dialectal variation. In a nutshell, the basic
meaning of krak is always one of general alarm, but due to lexical competition this
meaning is strengthened in Tai into something like dangerous non-aerial predator,
and is thus naturally applied to leopards; but on Tiwai the result of this strengthening is
nearly vacuous for lack of terrestrial predators, and for this reason strengthening fails
to apply. In Sect. 7, we briefly sketch some alternative directions that should be
explored in future research, and we conclude with some open problems in Sect. 8.
2 Morphology and syntax of Campbell’s monkey alarm calls
2.1 Methods
Data on primate alarm calls are typically collected in three ways.
(i) Naturalistic collection of calls: researchers may record naturally occurring
triggering events, and see how they affect Campbell’s monkey alarm calls;
they may also record monkey alarm calls, and assess what effect they have
on conspecifics (or in some cases on Diana monkeys).
(ii) Artificially triggered calls: researchers may perform controlled experiments
in which they artificially place a trigger to assess what its effect will be on
the calling behavior of the target species. Triggers are of two kinds: (a)
auditory or visual stimuli corresponding to predators (e.g. playback of
eagle shrieks and leopard growls, presentation of model eagles and leop-
ards); (b) playback of alarm calls by Campbell’s monkeys or Diana mo-
nkeys. (Inclusion of the latter could be useful because (1) Campbell’s
monkeys and Diana monkeys often form mixed-species groups, and thus
are used to each other’s calls; (2) it was shown in earlier research (e.g.
Zuberbu¨hler 2000, 2002) that there is significant comprehension of calls
across the two species; and (3) Campbell’s male monkeys might be induced
to ‘translate’ a Diana call more readily than they would another Campb-
ell’s monkey’s call, since in the latter case their own calling behavior might
be fully redundant.)
(iii) Artificially triggered avoidance behavior: researchers may also observe the
target species to assess how it reacts to various alarm calls: for instance, a
monkey may look up when hearing an eagle alarm call, or it may flee in the
canopy when hearing a leopard alarm call (e.g. Seyfarth et al. 1980a, b).
In the present study, we base our analyses on data collected through methods (i) and
(ii).
The data we analyze are subject to various sources of noise, both from the
environment and from the calls themselves. At the ‘environmental’ level, there is
uncertainty as to what is happening in the forest at any given moment, and although
the responses we observe are probabilistically linked to the triggering event, various
additional events may intervene over the course of the call sequences. At the
Monkey semantics 451
123
‘linguistic’ level, we work from transcriptions of acoustic signals that include calls
and all sorts of noises. We will rely on the transcriptions obtained from previous
research, but the categorization may have to be revisited in the future, both because
of the quality of the signal and because the categorization may be challenged. For
these reasons, we will base our conclusions on statistical analyses of tendencies
we observe in the data. This need not entail that the underlying grammar is
probabilistic.
2.2 Morphology
Earlier research (e.g. Ouattara et al. 2009a, b) identified five discrete elements in the
alarm calls of male Campbell’s monkeys of the Tai forest: krak, hok, wak, boom,
-oo. -oo is only found after krak, hok and wak, and it is treated as a suffix by Ouattara
et al. 2009a. Boom, which is produced with air sacs, is usually restricted to the initial
position of a sequence, where it appears in duplicated form: boom boom. krak and hok
can appear on their own, or suffixed with -oo. In the data described in Ouattara et al.
(2009b), wak does not appear on its own, but it does in later data collected by the same
team, and described below. As noted, we take the transcriptions as given, but it must be
borne in mind that conclusions about the morphology, syntax and semantics ultimately
depend on a proper phonetic and possibly phonological analysis, a question that should
probably be revisited in the future.9 We thus define the morphology of the language
under study as in (4) and (5).
(4) Roots and affixes [initial analysis]
a. Roots: boom, hok, krak (, wak)
b. Bound affixes: -oo
(5) Lexicon [initial analysis]
a. Every root is a word.
b. If R is a root different from boom, R-oo is a word.
An important note is in order. Ouattara et al. (2009a, b) took wak to be
distinct from the other roots. Since they did not find instances of wak alone, this
means that they distinguished between wak-oo, hok-oo and krak-oo. But Keenan
et al. (2013) showed using a clustering analysis that wak-oo’s might be better
analyzed as variants of hok-oo’s.10 Due to the uncertainties about their correct
9 An initial step in this direction was taken by Kuhn (2013), who undertook a phonetic study of -oo,
arguing that its properties are indeed consistent with the behavior one might expect of a suffix.
10 Keenan et al. (2013) performed their analyses on data collected by Klaus Zuberbu¨hler in the Tai forest
between 1994 and 2000. They describe their first clustering analysis as follows (further analyses were also
performed):
‘‘We first carried out a two-step cluster analysis based on six acoustic and temporal variables and one
categorical variable (whether or not the stem had an ‘oo’ suffix). This generated four distinct clusters,
with a silhouette number of 0.53, as optimal (k 1/4 4, s(i) 1/4 0.53; Fig. 2). In contrast to the previously
published classification with five call types (‘hok’, ‘krak’, ‘hok-oo’, ‘krak-oo’ and ‘wak-oo’, Ouattara
et al. 2009a, b), this classification did not discriminate between ‘hok-oo’ and ‘wak-oo’. Thus, the four
resulting clusters were identified as ‘hok’, ‘krak’, ‘hok-oo’ and ‘krak-oo’.’’
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categorizations, we decided to exclude wak-oo’s and wak’s from the quantitative
analyses we performed (which pertained to more recent datasets, as we discuss
in Sect. 2.4).
2.3 Syntax
As mentioned, Ouattara et al. (2009b) noted that boom boom only appears at the
very beginning of sequences; but for the rest the authors were primarily concerned
with the composition of sequences rather than with the order of elements that
appeared in them. Here too, some methodological concerns are bound to affect
future research: in field experiments, an external stimulus (e.g. a model eagle or
leopard, or a played back sequence) triggers a sequence of alarm calls, whose
beginning can thus be established more or less precisely; but what should count as
the end of a sequence is less clear, and extraneous events may occur while a
sequence is produced, which may affect its content.
What do Campbell’s call sequences look like? With the abbreviations in (6),
some example sequences are given in (7)–(9).
(6) Abbreviations
boom = b, krak = k, krak-oo = K, hok = h, hok-oo = H, wak
= w, wak-oo = W
(7) Examples from the Tai forest [new dataset, playback experiments]
a1. Eagle shrieks
(i) hhhk
(ii) hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhWhhhh
WWhHWhhWWhWhhWhWhWWwhWWWwWhhKhKKKWKWKKKh
hKWWKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
a2. Campbell eagle call:
(i) hhhhhhhhhhhhHhhhhhHhHHHWWWWHHhHWWWWWWWWWW
WWWWWWWW
(ii) KKKKKKKK
b1. Leopards growls
(i) kkkkkkKK
(ii) kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
b2. Campbell leopard calls
(i) KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
(ii) KkKKKKKKKkkKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKkK
(8) Examples from Tiwai island [new dataset, playback experiments]
a1. Eagle shrieks
(i) kkKKKKKKKKKK
(ii) KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
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a2. Diana eagle calls
(i) KKKKkkKK
(ii) hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhHhhhHhwhhKwwhhhWwWWWWWWWWW
Wh?hWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWKWWWWWKKKWWWKWK
KWWKkkkkk
b1. Leopard growls
(i) KKKKKKKKKK
(ii) kkKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKkkKKKKKKKKK
b2. Diana leopard calls
(i) KKKK
(ii) kkKKKKKKKK
c. Falling trees
(i) BBKKKKKKK
(ii) KKKK
(9) Examples from the Tai forest (data used by Ouattara et al. 2009a, b)
a1. Real eagle: (i) hHWK (ii) HhKhWK
a2. Associated eagle call: (i) K (ii) KWhK
a3. Model eagle: (i) hKWKhHWK (ii) hWhWhWKWHWK
a4. Eagle call (shriek): (i) KWK (ii) hHKWK
b1. Real leopard: (i) k (ii) kKkK
b2. Associated leopard call: (i) K (ii) kK
b3. Leopard call (growl): (i) K(ii) kKk
b4. Model leopard: (i) k (ii) kKkKkK
c. Tree/branch: (i) BBK (nearly all of this type)
(ii) BBKk (2 instances)
d. Inter-group: (i) BBHK (ii) BBKHK
e. Cohesion and Travel: BB (all of this type)
Given the initial data we have access to, the striking fact seems to be that a
reasonable description can be provided with a finite state grammar (i.e. the very
model that was refuted for human language by Chomsky 1957). Notably, there are
quite a few cases in which there appears to be a varying number of repetitions of a
call in a sequence. Sample finite state rules are given in (10), where * is a modified
Kleene star, meaning: C1 occurrence (we put in parentheses optional components).
(10) Sample syntactic rules (non-exhaustive)
a. Cohesion and Travel: bb
b. Tree/branch: bb K*
c. Inter-group: bb (K) H * K *
d. Leopard (various contexts): k K*, k k*
e. Eagle (various contexts): K K*, h*k, K*h*K*
It is far too early to make any substantive claims about the syntax, which appears to be
rather complex. But the fact that boom primarily occurs at the beginning of sequences is
fairly clear, as can be seen in the dataset from Ouattara et al. (2009a, b) (Tai) and in the
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new datasets (from Tai and Tiwai) we investigate in this piece (it is worth pointing out
that the positional restriction is clearer in the data from Ouattara et al. 2009a, b).
(11) Average position of calls in different datasets (non-zero occurrences of
boom are in red)
Be that as it may, we leave a closer investigation of the syntax of Campbell’s calls for
future research (for better or worse, our semantic analysis will be largely independent
from details of the syntax, due to the simplicity of the composition rules we posit).
2.4 Quantitative analyses (new datasets from Tai and Tiwai)
The three datasets mentioned above are not homogeneous.
– The dataset from Tai used in Ouattara et al. (2009a, b) involved more
environments, many of them based on naturally occurring events; and they were
transcribed by ear. 224 sequences were collected in the Tai Forest, 43 were
obtained from Eagle playback stimuli, 39 from Leopard playback stimuli and
142 were collected as various events happened in the forest (e.g., tree falls).
– The new datasets from Tai and Tiwai are primarily of type (ii) described
above—they come from ‘playback experiments’ (except for tree falls on Tiwai).
We analyzed 217 call sequences containing a total of 8,868 individual calls (182
of these calls could not be transcribed with certainty, and they were thus
disregarded in subsequent analyses). Both new datasets were coded with the
help of a statistical analysis of the acoustic signal.
Since our main goal is to compare the two sites, we focused on data that were
otherwise as similar as possible, and hence analyzed the two new datasets, which
were transcribed with comparable methods.11 Unless otherwise noted, all quanti-
tative data pertain to the new datasets; but we will make occasional reference to the
older dataset from Tai when this can illuminate the analysis; the key reason is that
11 Since we rely on transcriptions, it is necessary to check their reliability. We compared the results of
two transcriptionists for n = 1,355 elements, and found agreement in 77 % of all cases, corresponding to
Fleiss’ kappa = 0.712 (Fleiss 1981). The agreement is ‘‘substantial’’ according to the scale of Landis and
Koch (1977). We argued above in the text (Sect. 2.2) that wak and wak-oo should be excluded from this
analysis due to uncertainties in categorization; when this is done, the rate of agreement increases to 87 %,
and Fleiss’ kappa to 0.812, corresponding to ‘‘almost perfect agreement’’ in the scale of Landis and
Koch (1977).
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the older Tai data included many naturalistic situations, hence a greater diversity of
triggers for the calls under study.
The stimuli used for the playback experiments were of different types (see Table (12)):
– On both sites, triggering events predominantly involved the predators’ own calls
(eagle shrieks or leopard growls).
– In Tai, Campbell’s monkey calls obtained in response to predators’ vocaliza-
tions were used as triggering stimuli.
– On both sites, playback experiments also used alarm calls from Diana monkeys,
collected from responses to predator playbacks (either eagle shriek or leopard
growls). The same stimuli were used both on Tai and Tiwai; they were obtained
from Diana monkeys in Tai (where both eagles and leopards can be found).
As a first approximation, we aggregated the stimuli depending on whether they
corresponded to (a) the presence of an eagle, or (b) the presence of a leopard. As
noted by a reviewer, one may worry that an asymmetry between the two sites could
emerge because the subjects from one site were acquainted with the stimuli but
those from the other weren’t—for instance, the Diana monkey calls used in
playback experiments on both sites originated from the Tai forest, and hence Tai
Campbell’s monkeys might have been better acquainted with them. However, we
observed no relevant qualitative difference among the responses obtained to
different kinds of stimuli, as a visual inspection of (13) confirms. We therefore stick
to the first approximation of differentiating responses solely based on the Eagle vs
Leopard distinction in the triggering stimuli. On Tiwai, we also had access to 17
sequences corresponding to a general disturbance without a predator. Table 12
provides the number of call sequences of each type in the datasets we analyzed.
(12) Number of call sequences from our dataset in response to different playback
situations
Tai Tiwai
Eagle Shriek 24 23
Diana 12 23
Campbell 15
Leopard Growl 42 18
Diana 12 16
Campbell 15
General Disturbance (tree fall) 17
2.4.1 Qualitative overview
Figure 13 shows the distribution of each call type (hok, krak, etc.) in the different
types of contexts on the two sites. We will focus attention on eagle- and leopard-
related contexts broadly, irrespective of the types of stimuli used in these contexts
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(Predator Call, Campbell’s Call, Diana Call). Figure 14 thus displays an aggregated
version of the data in Figure 13.
(13) Number of calls of different types in response to different playback stimuli
in Tai and on Tiwai—detailed version
(14) Number of calls of different types in response to different types of playback
stimuli in Tai and on Tiwai—aggregated version
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2.4.2 Specific meanings of calls: hok refers to eagles, and krak might refer to
leopard (to be refined)
These quantitative results give us an initial indication on the meaning of hok and
krak:
(15) Hok is predominantly associated with eagles and krak is predominantly
associated with leopards
a. Hok calls occur significantly more often in Eagle than in Leopard
contexts (v2(1) = 631, p \ .001).
b. Krak calls display the opposite pattern: they predominantly occur in
Leopard contexts (v2(1) = 36, p \ .001).
These results provide initial evidence that hok is an alarm call for aerial predators,
while krak is an alarm call for terrestrial predators. Under these assumptions, the
present result can be described as demonstrating that there is then an overwhelming
proportion of appropriate uses of these calls.12
2.4.3 Krak as a (more) general alarm call
While krak and hok are predominantly associated with Leopard and Eagle contexts
respectively, this association is much stronger for hok than it is for krak: despite our
initial result, krak is a more general alarm call than hok.
(16) Krak is a more general alarm call than hok
a. The association of hok with Eagle contexts is stronger than the association
of krak with Leopard contexts. In other words, on the assumption that hok is
appropriate in eagle-related contexts while krak is appropriate in leopard-
related contexts, krak occurs more often in inappropriate (Eagle) contexts
than hok occurs in inappropriate (Leopard) contexts: v2(1) = 368,
p \ .001.13 Thus, even though krak occurs more often in Leopard contexts,
there are still many instances of it in Eagle contexts.
b. Krak can also be found in non-predator-related contexts: 335 such
occurrences are found on Tiwai (where we have access to non-predator-
related contexts), which accounts for 19% of the total number of kraks. By
comparison, hok is only found 3 times in such contexts, or in 1.3% of all
cases.
2.4.4 Comparison between Tai and Tiwai
In this section, we compare the use of calls in Tai and on Tiwai. The most important
result concerns reactions to Eagle situations. These situations are ecologically
12 This result holds on both sites (that is, if we run the analyses on the data for Tai and for Tiwai
separately).
13 This result holds both in Tai (v2(1) = 39, p \ .001) and on Tiwai (v2(1) = 155, p \ .001).
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plausible at both sites, since eagles are present at both sites (whereas leopards are
present in Tai only); thus any difference found in such contexts can probably not be
attributed to superficial differences in how these situations are perceived. The result
is as follows:
(17) In Eagle contexts, there are more hoks than kraks in Tai and more kraks
than hoks on Tiwai.
In response to Eagle-related stimuli, we obtained more hoks (561) than kraks
(92) in Tai, but crucially more kraks (794) than hoks (205) on Tiwai. This
dissociation between the two sites is statistically significiant (v2(1) = 676,
p \ .001).
In other words, on Tiwai, krak occurs frequently in Eagle situations, even more
frequently than the expected specific Eagle call hok. This result can be understood if
krak can serve as a general alarm call, as we suggest below.
As a control, we investigated Leopard situations. Recall that leopards are attested
in Tai but not on Tiwai. Hence calls triggered in these situations may be subject to
two sources of variation: broad differences between the two populations, and
differences pertaining to the fact that Leopard stimuli have a different cognitive
import on the two sites (since Tai monkeys know what leopards are, while Tiwai
monkeys don’t). In fact, we found no difference here, which suggests that these two
sources are not responsible for the result in (17).
(18) There is no significant difference between Tai and Tiwai in Leopard contexts.
In response to Leopards, no difference is found between the ratio of kraks
and hoks (657/23 in Tai and 499/26 on Tiwai): v2(1) = 1.49, p = .22.
(19) There is a significant difference between the positive result about Eagle
contexts and the negative results about Leopard contexts.
The difference found about Eagles (in (17)) is greater than the (absence of a)
difference found about Leopards (in (18)): v2(1) = 922, p \ .001.
These latter observations suggest that the result in (17) reflects a linguistic
reorganization due to a change in the environments, and in particular that it is not
due to a general tendency of Tai Campbell’s monkeys to utter more hoks than their
cousins from Tiwai island.
3 Semantics of Campbell’s monkey alarm calls
Our main focus in this paper will be on the semantics. As we announced in Sect. 2.2,
we leave out wak and wak-oo from the present discussion, as their distribution is not
currently understood (they were initially treated as independent forms, but wak-oo
was re-analyzed by Keenan et al. (2013) as a variant of hok-oo). We note however
that the graphs in (13) or (14) do not reveal striking differences in the use of wak/oo
and hok/oo, and thus it is unlikely that our analyses would be affected if the former
were included and were treated as a variant of the latter.
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Inferences about the meaning of different calls are drawn by considering sets of pairs of
the form \triggering event, calling sequence[ collected using the methods described in
Sect. 2.1. Very roughly, the lexical meanings of the calls appear to be as follows (but this
characterization will be refined and modified as we develop our analysis):
(20) Informal description of the lexical meanings (except wak, wak-oo)
a. boom boom: ‘this is not a situation of predation’
b. krak-oo: ‘there is an alert’
c. hok: ‘there is an eagle’
d. hok-oo: ‘there is an alert upwards’
e. krak: (i) ‘there is a leopard’ (Tai); (ii) ‘there is an alert’ (Tiwai)
One of the main puzzles concerns krak: it is primarily used as a leopard alarm call in
Tai, and as a general alarm call on Tiwai.
We will develop a relatively standard model-theoretic semantics, which will be
relativized to a model and a situation of utterance. As is standard, we write IM, s(w) for the
lexical value of a word w in a model M and in a situation s, and [[w1… wn]] M, s for the
semantic value in s of a sequence made of calls w1 … w2. We will argue that an alarm
parameter a (or later a time parameter) should be added as well at the compositional level,
so that our ‘official’ notation will become: [[w1…wn ]] M, s, a (we will write IM, s(w) rather
than IM, s, a(w) because the alarm/time parameter will play no role at the lexical level).
Since no operator ever manipulates the parameters M and s, we can usually leave them
implicit, and thus write I(w) and [[w1…wn]] a instead of Is(w) and [[ w1…wn ]] M, s, a.14
The rest of this discussion is organized as follows. Since most of the complexity
lies in the lexical semantics, we start with the least sophisticated part of our analysis,
which pertains to call composition: we define a single rule which interprets
concatenation as conjunction, while ensuring that each occurrence of a call raises
the value of the alarm parameter (it will later be reinterpreted in terms of a temporal
parameter). We then define the lexical semantics of the calls whose semantics does
not appear to be subject to variation, and illustrate the formal system with a few
worked out examples. The analysis of krak, which is subject to dialectal variation, is
the object of Sect. 4.
3.1 Rule of composition
How are the lexical meanings of calls combined? For human language, the
semantics is usually taken to be compositional, in the (weak) sense that the meaning
of an expression is determined from the meaning of its components15 and the way
they are put together by the syntax. From that perspective, it goes without saying
that a proper semantics cannot be defined unless one understands the syntax. But as
we noted above, the syntax of Campbell’s monkey calls is anything but clear at this
14 The parameters M and s will play a role when we develop a theory of pragmatic strengthening in Sect.
6 (an operation of pragmatic strengthening will be assumed to take place unless it yields falsity for all (or
most) situations s of a site/model M).
15 The term ‘strong compositionality’ is usually applied when the meaning of an expression is
determined from the meaning of its immediate components and the way they are put together.
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point (even if a finite-state analysis might be promising). Pending further
investigation, we will assume that concatenation is basically interpreted as
conjunction: a sequence w1w2 is simply interpreted as the conjunction of w1 and
w2 (this is also the assumption that is often made about sequences of sentences in
discourse in human language). Without further elaboration, however, this analysis
would have an immediate drawback: it would fail to give any role to the numerous
repetitions seen in Campbell’s monkey alarm calls.
Lemasson et al. (2010) note that in at least some cases the call rate—i.e. the
number of calls per time unit—reflects as a first approximation the urgency of the
threat (they write H, K, K?, B for hok, krak, krak-oo and boom respectively; we have
replaced their notation with ours):
the call rates of four different alarm series (termed [hok], [krak], [krak-oo],
and [boom] series) vary systematically as a function of context, associated
behaviour, and identity of the caller. [krak-oo] series were given more rapidly
to predation than non-predation events, [krak-oo] and [krak] series more
rapidly to visual than auditory predator detection, and [hok] series more
rapidly while counterattacking an eagle than staying put.
In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we will initially assume that each
occurrence of a call raises a general and unspecific alarm level.16 Importantly,
however, this parameter will not exhaust the contribution of a call: the first
occurrence of any given type always has a bona fide truth-conditional contribu-
tion.17 Technically, this can be achieved by relativizing our interpretation function
[[ . ]]M,s to an alarm parameter a, and by positing the rule in (21), where I is the
interpretation of lexical items, and 1 and 0 are used for true and false, as is standard;
as announced, we will write [[ . ]]a instead of [[ . ]]M,s,a.
(21) Compositional Semantics [time-insensitive version, to be revised]
For any alarm level a, for any word w, for any string S,
a. [[w]]a = 1 iff I(w) = 1 and the alarm level is at least a.
b. [[w S]]a = 1 iff [[w]]a = 1 and [[S]]a?1 = 1
A schematic example will help see the rule in action. Suppose that we are evaluating
the calls w, ww and ww’ relative to an initial alarm parameter of 0. The effects are
given in (22): each call contributes its lexical meaning, and the total number of calls
determines the alarm parameter.
16 There are other species in which the number of calls is correlated with intensity. For instance, Arnold
and Zuberbu¨hler (2012) note that the distance traveled by putty-nosed monkeys after hearing a pyow hack
sequence is an increasing function of the total length of the sequence, or of the number of pyows uttered
(in the authors’ data, the two variables are confounded).
17 This description pertains to the first model we develop below. In our second model, the semantic
content of any call is relativized to the precise time of its utterance, and for this reason two calls uttered at
t and t?1 don’t have the same informational content, since one provides information about the source’s
state of mind at t, and the other at t?1. In that model, re-iteration of a call indicates that the caller
remained in a state of alarm for a certain period of time.
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(22) a. [[w]]0 = 1 iff I(w) = 1 and the alarm level is at least 0, iff I(w) = 1.
b. [[ww]]0 = 1 iff I(w) = 1 and [[w]]1 = 1, iff I(w) = 1 and the alarm
level is at least 1.
c. [[ww’]]0 = 1 iff I(w) = 1 and [[w’]]1 = 1, iff I(w) = 1 and I(w’) and
the alarm level is at least 1.
It is immediate that if the initial alarm level is zero, the final alarm level divided
by the time elapsed since the beginning of the sequence will provide the average call
rate, and hence an approximation of the observations in Lemasson et al. (2010).18 It
is clear that the role of the call rate could be captured in several other ways; the
device of the alarm parameter is only intended to make the semantics particularly
simple.
3.2 Lexical semantics
Let us now turn to the lexical semantics, where most of the action will be. We start
with the subpart of the calls whose semantics will remain essentially constant across
our two models. We follow Ouattara et al. (2009b) in taking boom boom to indicate
that the context is one that doesn’t involve predation; we argue that hok involves
aerial predators (though this analysis will be refined later); and that -oo is a suffix
that broadens the meaning of a root and probably makes its informative content less
urgent.
3.2.1 boom boom
Ouattara et al. (2009b) described boom as being indicative of non-predation contexts
(here too, we replace the authors’ abbreviation of calls with ours):
Nonpredation events were characterized by the production of two boom calls,
which could be given alone (to indicate group movement) or which could
introduce subsequent calls (100%, n = 142 cases, all eight males). In response
to tree falls, the booms preceded a series of [krak-oo] calls. In response to
neighbors, the booms preceded a series of [hok-oo] calls, followed by a series
of [krak-oo] calls.
It is interesting to note that in the dataset analyzed in Ouattara et al. (2009b) the
effect is categorical: boom only occurs in non-predation contexts. The facts are less
clear in the datasets we analyze in the present piece, as shown in (23).19
18 We might want to have a slightly more refined version of rule (21)b, one in which the alarm level is
not raised by boom boom, which indicates that the context is not one of predation. This wouldn’t make
much practical difference, however, since boom boom is usually not repeated and hence won’t have a
significant effect on the alarm level.
19 There are several possible explanations for the difference. One is that in field experiments Ouattara
excluded sequences produced in ‘impure’ contexts, for instance when a playback was followed by
extraneous events (e.g. reactions by other animals). As noted at the beginning of Sect. 2.4, transcription
methods were also different (by ear for Ouattara, by ear and with the help of a statistical analysis of the
acoustic signal for our more recent data).
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(23) Use of boom in three datasets
Number of sequences containing boom/Total number of sequences
Disturbance Tai from
Ouattara et al.
(2009b)
Tai new dataset
(this paper)
Tiwai new
dataset
(this paper)
Leopard 0/39 16/69 1/34
Eagle 0/43 6/51 0/46
Tree 53/53 – 4/17
Inter-group 76/76 – –
Cohesion and Travel 13/13 – –
Despite these subtleties, we will assume that Ouattara et al. (2009b) are
essentially correct. We will thus posit the lexical rule in (24), where we have made
the choice of treating boom boom as a single lexical item (since boom usually occurs
in duplicated form):
(24) Meaning of boom (preliminary)
IM,s(boom-boom) = 1 iff there is a disturbance but no predator in s
3.2.2 hok
Ouattara et al. (2009b) noted that hok and hok-oo are often associated with the
presence of eagles. Restricting attention for the moment to hok, we categorized its
occurrences as ‘appropriate’ (given the hypothesis) if they appear in contexts that
involve eagles, namely ones in which the call was triggered by real or model eagles,
or eagle shrieks, or Campbell or Diana calls normally associated with eagles;
occurrences of hok that appear in other contexts may be called ‘inappropriate’. As
we saw in Sect. 2.4.2, under this assumption most uses of hok are in fact
appropriate.
Using the same format as in (24), we can provide a preliminary interpretive rule
for hok:
(25) Meaning of hok (preliminary)
IM,s(hok) = 1 iff there is an aerial predator in s
Importantly, the existence of a call solely or primarily used for raptors is common
across primates, and it is found in species that have only the most distant of
relationships with Campbell’s monkeys. As we mentioned in Sect. 1.3, the same
finding was made across several primate species, as mentioned by Wheeler and
Fischer (2012). While we will consider a refinement of the lexical meaning of hok in
Sect. 5.4.1, we will preserve the consequence that in most cases hok warns of the
presence of an aerial predator. (We will also posit that despite initial appearances
krak is a general alarm call, but the argumentation will be indirect.)
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3.2.3 -oo
We will work on the assumption that -oo has a stable compositional meaning, i.e.
that it modifies in a regular way the meaning of the root it attaches to. Furthermore,
we assume that -oo attached to a root R attenuates or broadens the meaning of R. An
initial motivation for this assumption lies in the comparative distribution of krak vs.
krak-oo in the Tai forest: there are more non-leopard-related uses of krak-oo than of
krak, as shown in (26).20
(26) Krak-oo occurs more frequently in non-leopard-related situations than krak
does
a. 84% of all kraks are found in Leopard situations (499/591).
b. By contrast, ‘only’ 72% of all krak-oos are found in Leopard situations
(1245/1741) (v2(1) = 38, p \ .001).
The Tai dataset used in Ouattara et al. (2009a, b) is particularly informative in
this connection because it contains more triggering situations than the new datasets
we otherwise focus on. And it is striking in this case that -oo-modified forms
(hatched bars) occur in many environments in which unmodified forms (open bars)
do not occur: as shown in (27), krak doesn’t occur in Eagle, Inter-group, and Tree
fall situations, but krak-oo does; and hok doesn’t occur in Inter-group situations, but
hok-oo does. The converse situation (with an unmodified form occurring in an
environment in which the modified form doesn’t occur) doesn’t arise here.
(27) Distribution of calls in the dataset used in Ouattara et al. (2009a, b)
(It must be mentioned, however, that in the two recent datasets we study in this
paper, some facts go in the opposite direction, as seen in the detailed distribution of
20 The effect goes in the same direction for the hok/hok-oo pair but to a much weaker degree (96 % of
hoks are found in Eagle situations (561/587) while 94 % of hokoos are found in Eagle situations.
v2(1) = 1.3, p = .26). Note however that along that measure the specificity of wak (84 % in Eagle
situations) seems lower than the specificity of wakoo (92 % in Eagle situations).
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calls in (13): in Tai Diana Leopard contexts and in Tiwai predator Eagle contexts,
there are respectively 21 and 66 hok’s, but no hok-oo’s.21)
Using the same format as in (24) and (25) above, we can define the semantic
contribution of -oo as in (28):
(28) Meaning of -oo (to be revised)
for any root R different from boom-boom,22
IM,s(R–oo) = 1 iff in s there is a disturbance that licenses the same attentional
state as if IM, s(R) = 1, or in other words: in s there is a disturbance that
licenses the same attentional state as situations s0 such that
IM,s’(R) = 1.
Putting together our lexical rule for hok and our rule for -oo, we can obtain a
lexical meaning for hok-oo, as shown in (29):
(29) IM,s(hok–oo) = 1 iff in s there is a disturbance that licenses the same
attentional state as if IM,s(hok) = 1,
iff in s there is a disturbance that licenses the same
attentional state as if there is an aerial predator in s.
In other words, hok-oo warns the hearer to be in an attentional state of the sort that
one should be in for an aerial predator, but without providing the information that
there is in fact an aerial predator. So this could be a message to pay attention to what
is going on upwards without a commitment to the presence of an aerial predator (but
without excluding it either). It is immediate given this definition that the meaning of
hok-oo is broader than that of hok: the latter is only made true if an aerial predator is
present; while hok-oo is made true in the same situations, but also in ones in which
there is no predator.
One fact is striking in this respect: in naturalistic data originally discussed in
Ouattara et al. (2009a, b), hok-oo is used in each of the three instances of inter-group
encounters (in combination with krak-oo); the same situations do not give rise to
any unmodified hok, as shown in (30).
(30) Occurrence of hok-oo vs. hok in inter-group encounters in the Tai dataset
used in Ouattara et al. (2009a, b)
(B = boom; H = hok-oo; K = krak-oo; S* represents an uninterrupted
string of one or more S’s)
Pattern Number of sequences with the relevant pattern
a. BBH*K* 66
b. BBH*K*H*K* 1
c. BBK*H*K* 9
21 In Tiwai Diana Leopard contexts, there were also hok’s and no hok-oo’s, but it is harder to assess the
significance of this result because there were only five hok’s.
22 If the lexicon excludes boom-boom-oo, this precaution will be unnecessary. This might also be
excluded for articulatory reasons, or for semantic reasons (e.g. because boom-boom does not license any
attentional state per se).
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The occurrence of hok-oo in inter-group encounters need not be surprising if we
assume that most encounters occur high in the trees, which might license an
‘upwards’ attentional state, but of course without any implication that an eagle is
present. The occurrence of hok-oo in these contexts might provide additional
motivation for taking -oo to attenuate or broaden the meaning of the root it
attaches to.
One additional observation might be telling. While in many environments
suffixed R-oo calls are more frequent than unsuffixed R calls, the predominance of
the suffixed form is stronger as a reaction to Campbell’s calls than as a reaction to
Diana calls or to predator calls, as summarized in (31).
(31) The predominance of suffixed R-oo calls is greater as a reaction to
Campbell’s calls than as a reaction to Diana or to predator calls
a. Suffixed R–oo calls are more frequent than root R calls in conditions
triggered by Campbell’s calls (888 vs 162).
b. The corresponding numbers are 1398 vs 1607 with Diana calls and
(2066 vs 1929) with predator calls.
c. Crucially, the difference between a. and b. is statistically significant:
(v2(1) = 456, p \ .001).
This might conceivably be interpreted as follows: in conditions triggered by
Campbell’s calls, Campbell’s monkeys only need to complete the calls they have
heard, and for this reason the less specific -oo-modified calls can be used. By
contrast, in Diana or predator contexts, they must convey the full information about
the nature of the threat, and hence unsuffixed (and thus more specific) calls must be
used.
For reasons of simplicity, we have assumed that the meanings of krak-oo and
hok-oo are derived from the meaning of -oo combined with the meaning of krak and
hok respectively. This is an important theoretical step, as it implies some amount of
compositionality at the morphological level—of a less trivial sort than what we
found at the ‘sentential’ level, where our analysis only posited call conjunction with
increase of the alarm parameter (in (21)b). Of course one could also envisage an
analysis in which krak, hok, krak-oo and hok-oo are all treated by the semantics as
atomic units. It is clear that a non-compositional analysis has more degrees of
liberty than a compositional one, and hence we cannot refute the non-compositional
analysis. But two types of considerations can be adduced in favor of the
compositional treatment.23
– First, for obvious reasons the compositional analysis is more constrained and
potentially more predictive than the compositional one. Relatedly, we will see
after we have completed our discussion that a non-compositional analysis would
fail to draw connections that are made by the compositional treatment; we come
back to this point in the conclusion.
– Second, it leads one to expect that -oo might change the meaning of the root it applies
to in the same way in the case of krak and in the case of hok. One small finding goes in
23 Thanks to Ede Zimmermann (p.c.) for urging us to clarify this point.
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this direction; in their clustering analysis, Keenan et al. (2013) found that krak-oo and
hok-oo behave on a par, in giving rise to more gradations than krak and hok:
In sum, we found that vocalizations with highly specified ecological functions, such as
referential signals to leopards and eagles (i.e. ‘krak’ and ‘hok’), show very little
gradation between call types. In contrast, vocalizations with less specific functions
(i.e. ‘krak-oo’ and ‘hok-oo’) show more gradation, which may allow for flexible usage
and the ability to communicate multiple strands of information. (Keenan et al. 2013)
Now it could be that there are independent reasons for this similarity, but as things
stand the compositional analysis has an immediate account for it: it is because -oo
has the same semantic contribution in both cases that krak-oo stands to krak as hok-
oo stands to hok, and hence that both suffixed forms have less specific functions than
the corresponding roots.
3.3 Examples
Putting together the results of Sects. 3.1 and 3.2, we can derive truth conditions for
some very simple sequences. Consider first a single hok-oo call, whose lexical
semantics was discussed in (29). Assuming that the initial alarm level is 0 (and can
never fall below 0), we can apply rule (21)a to obtain the simple result in (32):
(32) [[hok-oo]]0 = 1 iff I(hok-oo) = 1 and the alarm level is at least 0,
iff there is a disturbance that licenses the same attentional
state as if there is an aerial predator (and the alarm level is
at least 0—a condition which is always met).
When the call is repeated, say twice, we need to apply rule (21)b; the result is the
same as in (32), except that for the resulting sentence to be true the alarm level must
be of at least 2.
(33) [[hok-oo hok-oo hok-oo]]0 = 1 iff [[hok-oo]]0 = 1 and [[hok-oo hok-oo]]1
= 1
iff [[hok-oo]]0 = 1 and [[hok-oo]]1 = 1 and
[[hok-oo]]2 = 1
iff there is a disturbance that licenses the
same attentional state as if there is an aerial
predator and the alarm level is at least 2.
We can also consider a simple sequence boom-boom hok-oo hok-oo hok-oo,
whose truth conditions are obtained from those of hok-oo hok-oo hok-oo in (33),
together with our assumptions about the meaning of boom-boom in (24); this kind of
sequence is of empirical interest, since it appears at the beginning of the numerous
sequences following patterns (30)a and (30)b discussed above.
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(34) [[boom-boom hok-oo hok-oo hok-oo hok-oo]]0 = 1
iff [[boom-boom]]0 = 1 and [[hok-oo hok-oo hok-oo]]1 = 1
iff there is a disturbance but no predator and there is a disturbance that
licenses the same attentional state as if there is an aerial predator and the
alarm level is at least 3.
As a result, this type of sequences might be expected to arise in environments in
which there is no predator (and thus no eagle), but something is still happening in
the canopy; this might account for the naturalistic observations in which hok-oo is
used in inter-group encounters, as was noted above.
While boom-boom won’t play a role in what follows, we will continue to assume
that (i) concatenation is interpreted as some version of conjunction, as we stated
above; (ii) hok has a meaning related to aerial predators (though we will fine-tune
the details); (iii) -oo has a compositional contribution that attenuates in some way
the meaning of the root it attaches to.24
It remains to analyze the semantics of krak. We will argue in Sect. 4 that its use is
subject to variation: even though eagle situations are presumably of the same type in
Tai and on Tiwai, they give rise to very different call sequences, with numerous
kraks on Tiwai but not in Tai. In Sect. 5, we will develop a lexical account of the
distinction, one in which krak is a general alarm call on Tiwai but a ground predator
call on Tiwai. In Sect. 6, we will develop an alternative analysis in which krak has
the same meaning on both sites, but the pragmatics of call use interacts with the
context in such a way as to give rise to a difference—despite the fact that all the
rules are the same on both sites.
(A terminological note is in order: we have been using the term ‘dialect’ informally,
to refer to an apparent difference in the use of a call across the two sites. In the first
analysis to be developed, there will be a dialectal difference in the technical sense: krak
will have different lexical entries across the two sites. In the second theory, the very same
linguistic system will be posited for the two sites, but its interaction with the context—
technically: with the model parameter—will account for the difference in use.)
3.4 Monkey logic25
While our semantic analysis is very elementary indeed, it does predict certain non-
trivial logical patterns. In our initial analysis, one such pattern is that krak should
entail krak-oo and hok should entail hok-oo, because -oo has the affect of
broadening the domain of application of the root it applies to (this property will be
retained in the lexicalist analysis we develop in Sect. 5, but not in the pragmatic
alternative we develop in Sect. 6). Another logical pattern pertains to contradictions.
Given the lexical entries we provided for boom-boom in (24), hok in (25), and -oo in
24 In the first model we develop, we will preserve rule (28), which predicts that R-oo should have a
broader range of uses than R. In our second model, -oo will restrict the meaning of R, but will specify that
the denoted threat is weak among those that license R. The attenuating function of -oo is thus
implemented very differently in the two models.
25 This section benefited from comments by several audience members, who urged us to determine
whether boom boom hok ever occurs.
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(26), we might expect that (i) boom can in fact co-occur with hok-oo, but that (ii)
boom never co-occurs with hok. The heart of the matter is that the first pattern
should be coherent in case there is a non-predator-related alert upwards, as shown in
(34); whereas the second pattern should be a contradiction, as shown in (35), since
boom is indicative of non-predatory situations whereas hok as analyzed is indicative
of aerial predators (the contradictory part is highlighted in bold).
(35) [[boom-boom hok]]0 = 1
iff [[boom-boom]]0 = 1 and [[hok]]1 = 1
iff there is a disturbance but no predator and there is an aerial predator
and the alarm level is at least 1.
Because it is contradictory, the pattern boom boom … hok… should be absent. This
prediction is arguably borne out: while there are quite a few cases of hok-oo co-occurring
with boom, hok almost never occurs in the same sequence, as shown in (36).26
(36) Boom, hok and hok-oo
Tai from
Ouattara
et al. (2009b)
New
dataset
from Tai
New
dataset
from Tiwai
Number of sequences that include at least one boom 142 22 5
Number of sequences that include at least
one boom and at least one hok-oo
76 6 0
Number of sequences that include at
least one boom and at least one hok
0 127 0
4 Two dialects: Tai vs. Tiwai
Following Arnold et al. (2013), we now argue that Campbell’s monkeys speak
different dialects in the Tai forest and on Tiwai Island; specifically, the call krak is
used with different functions in the two locations (the next sections will develop two
competing models of why this is so).
– As we noted in connection with Diana monkeys, the Tai and Tiwai
environments differ in terms of relevant predators: Tai has eagles and leopards,
whereas Tiwai has eagles but no leopards.
– To our knowledge, there is no evidence of a sizable genetic difference between
Campbell’s monkeys in Tai vs. on Tiwai; if so, we should assume that whatever
26 As we refine and modify our analysis of hok, this prediction will be affected as well; we discuss it
again below.
27 This sequence contained both hok and hok-oo, and was thus also counted in the cell above this one.
The sequence in question has the form in (i); it was given in Tai as a reaction to a playback of Campbell’s
eagle alarm calls (boom and hok appear in bold).
(i) boom boom hokoo hokoo hokoo hok hokoo hokoo hokoo hokoo hok hok wak wak wakoo krakoo
krakoo krakoo krakoo krakoo krakoo krakoo krakoo krakoo krakoo krak krak krakoo krakoo krakoo krak
krak krakoo krakoo krakoo krakoo krakoo krakoo krakoo
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innate specifications the calling system has does not significantly differ across
the two sites, so that a unified theory is called for.28
We noted in our discussion of Stephan and Zuberbu¨hler’s (2008) analysis of Diana
monkeys that the difference in calling behavior found between Tiwai and Tai could
potentially be due to a difference in life experience rather than in the meaning of the
sequences themselves. The heart of the matter was that the difference concerned
calling behavior to leopard-related stimuli, which are unknown on Tiwai—hence the
monkeys’ cognitive reaction might be understandably different from that of their
leopard-savvy cousins from Tai. In order to construct an argument in favor of a
linguistic difference, we need to show that in one and the same cognitive situation,
Tiwai monkeys call differently from Tai monkeys. Precisely this case can be found for
Campbell’s monkeys. Although the relevant ecological difference between Tai and
Tiwai pertains to leopards, Campbell’s monkeys call to eagles in a different way on the
two sites. This is the sign of a sophisticated system, one in which either (a) the
meanings expressed by the calls are not exactly the same across the two sites, or (b)
these meanings or the decision to use them is sensitive in some way to the environment
of the speaker rather than just to the narrow situation in which calls are uttered. Given
some plausible assumptions, the opposite theory, stated in (37), can be refuted:
(37) Theory 0 (to be refuted)
(a) The lexical meaning of calls is entirely innate.
(b) i. These meanings are only sensitive to the narrow situation in which they
are used, i.e. to the relevant events (eagle presence, leopard presence,
etc.) in the speaker’s immediate environment.
ii. The choice of the messages (i.e. truth conditions) uttered is only
determined by the narrow situation in which they are used.
Let us assume that eagle-related situations are the same in all relevant respects in Tai
and on Tiwai. By (37)b(ii), the same messages are expressed in the same situations at
the two sites. By (37)a, the words have the same meanings at the two sites, and by
(37)b(i) these meanings have the same truth conditions in the same situations. This
predicts that the very same calls should be found in eagle-related situations at the two
sites—which is exactly the opposite from what we found: as we saw in Sect. 2.4.4, krak
is almost never used to call to eagles in Tai, but is very common in such situations on
Tiwai. Of course this makes much functional sense: a leopard alarm call might have
great survival value in the Tai forest, but none whatsoever on Tiwai island—and thus it
is ‘reasonable’ for Tiwai monkeys to use this call for different purposes. We will see in
the next two sections how a formal model can account for these differences.
Note that there might well be further differences between the dialect used on
Tiwai and that practiced in Tai. For instance, as shown in (38), data on sequence
length differ across Tai and on Tiwai. First, sequences are generally longer on
28 We do not know of any genetic data comparing Tiwai and Tai Campbell’s monkeys. However, the
entire guenon clade evolved relatively recently (maybe in the neighborhood of 200,000 years ago), and
until a few hundred years ago Campbell’s monkeys were part of one continuous population from Ghana to
Sierra Leone; this wouldn’t seem to offer enough time for major genetic changes to emerge.
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Tiwai. Second, while on Tiwai Leopard and Eagle contexts give rise to sequences of
equal length, in Tai Eagle sequences are longer than Leopard sequences.
(38) Mean sequence length in Tai and on Tiwai
Tai Tiwai
Mean sequence length
0
10
20
30
40 Eagle
Leopard
Tree
We do not have anything to say about this difference at this point. Similarly, it
certainly cannot be excluded that there are further differences within each population,
with different groups of Campbell’s monkeys (or even different individuals) speaking
in different ways (see fn. 8); we leave these issues for future research.
5 A lexicalist analysis
We will now develop a lexical account of the distinction between the meaning of krak
in the Tai forest and on Tiwai island. As a first approximation, we might want to say
that in Tai the meaning of krak involves leopards/ground predators, whereas on Tiwai
the same call is used as a general alarm call. While in human languages dialectal
variation usually involves both differences in morphology and in meaning, there are
cases in which the same word (possibly with slightly different pronunciations) has
different meanings: pants is normally used to refer to underwear in Great Britain, but
to trousers in the US29; the situation might be similar in the case of krak (with the
difference that misunderstandings among speakers of different dialects might have
more momentous consequences). Still, as we will now see, a lexical analysis of this
dialectal difference must be made more complex if it is to maintain our assumption that
krak-oo is compositionally derived from krak.
29 This and other cases are discussed in: http://www.srcf.ucam.org/camling/proceedings/rocavarela.pdf.
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5.1 Krak-oo as a general alarm call in Tai
We assumed in (28) that -oo modifies in a regular way the meaning of the root it
attaches to. But it can be shown that in Tai krak-oo has a meaning of general alarm;
this implies that we will need a kind of ambiguity in which krak has a (possibly
innate) meaning of general alarm, which (i) might hold on Tiwai as well, and (ii)
feeds the semantic derivation of the meaning of krak-oo; but it also has a
strengthened, acquired meaning which conveys information about leopards/ground
predators—and this meaning only arises in Tai.
The argument that krak-oo serves as a general alarm call in Tai is straightforward: as
we showed in Sect. 2.4.3, it occurs in high numbers in all triggering contexts. One might
be worried that the method of playback experiments introduces a bias, in that the stimuli
would typically come from under the monkeys. If so, these uses of krak-oo might be
compatible with a kind of ‘alert from below’ meaning. But this analysis is very
implausible, for two reasons: first, the graphs in (13) show that krak-oo was used
consistently in eagle alarms triggered by Campbell’s or Diana eagle alarm calls—and
even if these were played from below, there is no reason the target monkeys should
conclude that the relevant eagles were also coming from below; second, the earlier data
displayed in (27) (collected by Ouattara and discussed in Ouattara et al. (2009a, b))
include calls triggered by naturally occurring events—and in tree falls, group encounters
and also real eagle encounters, krak-oo was consistently found.30
5.2 Analysis
To account for these facts, we will posit that (i) krak has a (possibly innate) meaning
of general alarm in Tai and on Tiwai alike, but that (ii) it has an acquired meaning of
ground predator-related alarm in Tai. Technically, we need to assume an ambiguity
whereby the suffix -oo is added to the root krak1, whereas the word krak without -oo
is interpreted as krak2, which has a stronger meaning. Our morphological and
semantic assumptions are summarized below:
(39) Roots and affixes [ambiguity-based analysis]
a. Roots: boom, hok, krak1(, wak); in Tai only: krak2
b. Bound affixes: -oo
(40) Lexicon [revised analysis]
a. Every root is a word.
b. If R is a root different from boom and krak2, R-oo is a word.
30 The graphs in (27) aggregate reactions to eagles in natural encounters and in field experiments. Raw
data show that in 11 out of 11 encounters with real eagles krak-oo’s were produced. Note that the second
argument (from real eagle encounters) is more decisive than the first (reactions to Campbell’s or Diana
eagle alarm calls): for the latter, we could still posit for krak-oo a meaning akin to there is a threat
according to a source from below (partly by analogy with what we will posit for hok in (43)b).
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(41) Innate meanings (setting aside wak)
-Roots
a. IM, s(krak
1) = 1 iff there is a disturbance in s
b. IM, s(hok) = 1 iff there is an aerial predator in s
c. IM, s(boom-boom) = 1 iff there is a disturbance but no predator in s
-Affix
d. for any root R different from boom,
IM, s(R–oo) = 1 iff there is a disturbance that licenses the same attentional
state as if IM, s(R) = 1, or in other words: there is a disturbance that licenses
the same attentional state as situations s’ such that IM, s’(R) = 1
(42) Acquired meaning of krak in Tai only
IM, s(krak
2) = 1 iff there is a leopard in s
Note that we could devise a slightly simpler theory by allowing krak-oo to be
derived both from krak1 and krak2. If so, we could remove the underlined part of
(40)b, which prohibits affixation of -oo to krak2 (= the ‘leopard’ version of krak).
But this would raise a non-trivial question: since leopard-related uses of krak are
dominant in Tai, we must posit that the word krak2 is much more commonly used
than the word krak1. But since there are many uses of krak-oo that are not ground-
related (as seen for instance in Ouattara’s data in (27)), we might have to say that
the opposite pattern holds for krak2-oo vs. krak1-oo. Still, this potential simplifi-
cation could be explored in future research.
5.3 The ambiguity of krak
5.3.1 Asymmetry between krak and hok
Our informal statement of the main generalizations in (20) gives krak a leopard
meaning in Tai. But rule (39)a (which establishes that both krak1 and krak2 are
possible roots in Tai) combined with rule (39)b (‘every root is a word’) implies that
in Tai krak can be the realization of either krak1 or krak2. Thus the theory leaves
open the possibility that there could be some general alarm uses of krak even in Tai
(this is of course the normal situation on Tiwai).
While this is not a strong prediction of the theory (which could easily be modified
to block krak1 from being used as a word), it is probably a useful one. For as we
noted in Sect. 2.4.3, on the assumption that krak is leopard-related while hok is
eagle-related, there are more cases of ‘overapplication’ of krak than there are for
hok. We take these data to suggest that even in Tai krak sometimes has a function of
general alarm.31 What the lexicalist does not explain is what drives the choice
between krak1 and krak2, and why krak-oo is derived from krak1 rather than krak2.
31 In addition, krak is occasionally found in tree fall situations in the Tai dataset studied in Ouattara et al.
(2009a, b): 4 % of calls produced in these contexts are krak calls.
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5.3.2 The import of the compositional analysis of -oo
It is interesting to note that our analysis draws a connection between (i) a theory-
internal issue with respect to the Tai data, (ii) a fine-grained empirical problem in
the Tai data, and (iii) a dialectal comparison between Tai and Tiwai.
Let us start from the Tai data. (i) The theory-internal issue derives from the
assumption that the meanings of krak-oo and hok-oo are derived from the meaning
of -oo combined with the meaning of krak and hok respectively. Given our
hypothesis about -oo, this assumption of word-internal compositionality makes it
difficult to claim without further ado that krak has a meaning of ground predator, as
this would lead us to predict krak-oo should have a ground-related meaning as well.
It is for this reason that we were forced to posit an ambiguity in the root krak. (ii)
The empirical problem in Tai pertains to the existence of a small but significant
proportion of general alarm uses of krak, something that might be expected given
the ambiguity view. (iii) Finally, the existence even in Tai of a general alarm version
of krak makes it natural to posit that on Tiwai only that version of the root exists.
These connections could not be drawn without the assumption of word-internal
compositionality.32
5.4 Refinements and problems
Let us turn to some refinements and remaining problems for our lexicalist analysis.
5.4.1 Refinement I: hok
The meaning we posited for hok predicts that it should only be used in eagle-related
situations. But in Tai, hok occasionally appears as a reaction to leopard calls from
other Campbell’s monkeys; this does not follow from our current semantics. This
problem could potentially be solved by giving a weaker semantics to hok, with (43)b
replacing (43)a:
(43) a. Old rule: IM, s(hok) = 1 iff there is an aerial predator in s
b. Revised rule: IM, s(hok) = 1 iff there a threat according to a non-
terrestrial source in s, i.e. there is a non-terrestrial
predator in s or in s there is a non-terrestrial creature
informing of a threat.
32 As we will emphasize in the conclusion, the compositional analysis also draws an interesting
connection with the generalizations mentioned in Wheeler and Fischer (2012): despite initial appearances,
even in Tai krak has a general alarm meaning—a pattern found across several primate species, where the
ground predator call is often used as a general alarm call as well.
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Presumably Campbell’s monkey calls originate from trees, which might explain
why hok with the revised meaning in (43)b is used in these cases.33
5.4.2 Refinement II: possible mechanisms of evolution of the leopard meaning of
krak in Tai34
To go further, we should establish (i) whether Campbell’s monkeys have in
principle the ability to learn new meanings, and (ii) by which mechanism the
‘leopard’ meaning could come to be added on top of the ‘general alarm’ meaning.
We do not know of direct evidence pertaining to Campbell’s monkeys’ ability to
learn new meanings. Still, prior research displayed evidence of flexibility in two
domains. First, the detailed acoustic realization of (largely innate) calls of female
Campbell’s monkeys appears to be influenced by that of the females they are
‘friends’ with (specifically, acoustic similarity among the calls of dyads of female
Campbell’s monkeys was shown by Lemasson et al. (2011b) to be better predicted
by social affinity than by genetic similarity; see also Lemasson et al. 2005). Second,
it was also shown that turn-taking in conversation is subject to acquisition: the rate
of ‘inappropriate’ repetitions (in which a Campbell’s monkey fails to respect rules
of turn-taking) was shown by Lemasson et al. (2011a) to be greater in youngsters
than in adults. Needless to say, the existence of acoustic or pragmatic flexibility
does not directly answer the crucial question of semantic flexibility, which we leave
for future research.
It is worth asking about possible mechanisms of historical evolution of a
‘leopard’ meaning of krak in a population that originally started with a ‘general
alarm’ meaning. One might want to show that individuals that can in principle
acquire a leopard meaning have an advantage to do so in the environment of the Tai
forest. To see what the formal issues are, let us consider the problem in a very
simplified form, with just 1-call sequences; and let us restrict attention to the use of
hok and krak in Leopard and in Eagle situations. We assume that a Tai monkey can
adopt a strategy that defines its behavior as a sender and receiver of alarm signals.
We will assume that strategies are deterministic (‘pure’, in game-theoretic
parlance); thus a signal deterministically gives rise to a first reaction, which we
33 Three remarks should be added.
– We noted in (30) that in the Tai dataset used by Ouattara et al. (2009a, b), inter-group encounters give
rise to hok-oo but not hok. This still follows from our revised analysis of hok, as in these cases the
groups encountered do not constitute the source of an alarm call.
– Our analysis makes the prediction that hok could not be used as a reaction to leopard calls uttered by
Campbell’s monkeys that call from the ground. We leave this question for future research.
– In Sect. 3.4, we argued that boom boom … hok … should come out as a contradiction. But this result
doesn’t hold with the modified lexical entry for hok: modulo changes in the alarm parameter, we will
obtain a claim that there is a disturbance but no predator and there is a threat according to a non-
terrestrial source. But situations of that type might be rare or non-existent if nearly all cases in which
there is a threat according to a non-terrestrial source involve an aerial predator, or a monkey calling to
a ground or aerial predator. Still, our initial derivation of a contradiction in ‘monkey logic’ would
need to be revisited if we adopted the refinement of the meaning of hok explored in this section.
34 We are very grateful to Jean-Baptiste Andre´ and to Benjamin Spector for discussions pertaining to this
section.
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assume to be of just two types: ‘leopard-appropriate’ or ‘eagle-appropriate’. We also
take situations to be of two types—‘leopard situations’ or ‘eagle situations’—and
we assume that they deterministically give rise to a call. We further assume (very
simplistically) that the Sender of the signal and the Receiver derive the same pay-off
from the interaction, which counts as successful to the extent that the appropriate
reaction is successfully triggered in the receiver; and that in an interaction each
individual knows the strategy of the other. In principle, then, the relevant behavior
of any individual i is defined by a pair \Ri, Si[, where Ri is its strategy as a
receiver (‘which reaction should I adopt when I hear krak or hok?’) and Si is its
strategy as a sender (‘which call should I use in Leopard or in Eagle situations?’).
Since we did not find a difference between Tai and Tiwai in the meaning of hok,
we can assume that it is innately specified as in (41)b: IM,s(hok) = 1 iff there is an
aerial predator in s. As a result, when hok is used, the information conveyed is that
one is in an Eagle situation (but this does not entail that in an Eagle situation one
must produce hok—inspection of the raw data from the three datasets discussed in
Sect. 2.4 shows that some hok-less sequences are found in response to eagles, for
instance with krak-oo’s). On the assumption that the information conveyed is
accurate, the sender only has two possible strategies:
(44) Possible strategies for the sender
Sdistinct =\leopard_situation ? krak, eagle_situation ? hok[
Strivial =\leopard_situation ? krak, eagle_situation ?krak[
Similarly, a receiver that hears hok knows that the situation is an eagle-related
one, so the only choice concerns the interpretation of krak:
(45) Possible strategies for the receiver
Rdistinct = \krak ? leopard-appropriate_reaction, hok ?
eagle-appropriate_reaction[
Rtrivial = \krak ? eagle-appropriate_reaction, hok ?
eagle-appropriate_reaction[
We can now explore the assumption that strategies compete with each other; this
may be because a given individual randomly tries different strategies and only keeps
those that work best; or because individuals whose strategies are more successful are
later imitated by others (we do not appeal to genetic selection because this does not
seem to be relevant to account for the Tai vs. Tiwai contrast). In such a competition, it
is important to consider the Nash equilibria of this game, i.e. the pairs \R, S[ for
which neither the receiver nor the sender has an interest in deviating from its strategy
given what the other player’s strategy is. There are four pairs to consider: \Rdistinct,
Sdistinct[, \Rdistinct, Strivial[, \Rtrivial, Sdistinct[, \Rtrivial, Strivial[.
Under natural assumptions, \Rdistinct, Sdistinct[ is a strict Nash equilibrium, in the
sense that any deviation from either strategy yields smaller pay-offs. In \Rdistinct,
Sdistinct[, information is perfectly transmitted and thus pay-offs are at their maximum.
By contrast, if the receiver adopts strategy Rtrivial, the receiver will have an
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inappropriate response in Leopard situations; and if the sender adopts strategy Strivial,
the sender will cause the receiver to have an inappropriate response in Eagle situations.
By contrast, \Rdistinct, Strivial[ and \Rtrivial, Sdistinct[ are not Nash equilibria, not
even weak ones. Here some terminology will be helpful: in a strict Nash equilibrium, if
any player deviates from the equilibrium, he will receive a lower pay-off and will thus
be penalized; in a weak Nash equilibrium, we don’t require that deviations be
penalized, but only that they should not be rewarded. Now in the pair \Rdistinct,
Strivial[, the sender can yield superior pay-offs by adopting Sdistinct rather than Strivial,
as this will provide information that the receiver will use (since the receiver is using
strategy Rdistinct). In the pair \Rtrivial, Sdistinct[, the receiver can yield superior pay-
offs by adopting Rdistinct rather than Rtrivial, as this will allow the receiver to use the
information conveyed in the sender’s (non-trivial) signaling strategy.
Still, in some situations there is another Nash equilibrium, albeit a weak one—
namely \Rtrivial, Strivial[. Consider the following scenario: on average (i.e. without
specific information about the predator at hand), eagle-appropriate reactions yield a
greater pay-off than leopard-appropriate reactions. If so, the receiver will produce a
smaller pay-off by using Rdistinct than by using Rtrivial, since in that case the receiver
will systematically adopt the less optimal leopard-appropriate reaction. As for the
sender, it will produce the very same pay-offs if it adopts Sdistinct rather than Strivial,
since the information conveyed by the signal (‘leopard situation’ vs. ‘eagle
situation’) will systematically be disregarded by the receiver.
Can we appeal to evolutionarily stable strategies to rule out \Rtrivial, Strivial[?
According to the standard definition, strategy i is evolutionarily stable just in case
for all alternative strategies j, either (1) the payoff of i against i is greater than the
payoff of j against i, or (2) i and j have equal payoffs played against i, but i has a
greater payoff than j when played against j (see for instance Skyrms 1996). The
basic intuition is that i is evolutionarily stable just in case it can successfully resist
invasion by mutants j, which is the case if mutants fare less well against non-
mutants than the majority non-mutants do against each other (Condition (1)); or
mutants and non-mutants fare equally well against non-mutants, but non-mutants
fare better against mutants (Condition (2)). It is worth noting that if i is a strict Nash
equilibrium, then i is evolutionarily stable because Condition (1) is automatically
satisfied; but if i is just a weak Nash equilibrium, this need not be the case and one
may have to appeal to Condition (2) to determine whether the equilibrium is
evolutionarily stable. Now consider the problematic case in which on average eagle-
appropriate reactions yield a higher pay-off than leopard-appropriate reactions.
(i) First, it is clear that \Rdistinct, Sdistinct[ is evolutionarily stable, since it is
a strict Nash equilibrium and thus satisfies Condition (1).
(ii) Second, \Rtrivial, Strivial[ is not quite evolutionarily stable. There are two
relevant observations.
– First, deviation from Rtrivial will be penalized. The reason is this: Strivial
conveys no information whatsoever to the receiver, hence the best reaction
is to always have an eagle-appropriate reaction. Since Strivial only yields
utterances of krak, this means that against a non-mutant population that
plays Strivial, a mutant has no choice but to display an eagle-appropriate
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reaction when krak is heard, and thus to play Rtrivial (there is no other
choice because we have taken the meaning of hok to be systematically
eagle-related).
– Second, however, deviation from Strivial will not be penalized. This is
because against a population of mutants and non-mutants that play Rtrivial,
the choice of the signaling strategy doesn’t matter, and Sdistinct yields the
same pay-offs as Strivial.
So in principle \Rtrivial, Strivial[ could be invaded by \Rtrivial, Sdistinct[,
although the mechanism of the invasion is not clear (since the pay-offs aren’t greater
with the mutant than with the mutant strategy); one would need to appeal to further
considerations to explain how the invasion occurs (possibly ‘random drift’—see for
instance Binmore and Samuelson 1999). Importantly, however, if by some
mechanism \Rtrivial, Sdistinct[ prevails, it will eventually be invaded by \Rdistinct,
Sdistinct[. And the latter does assign a ‘leopard’ meaning to krak in the end.
Needless to say, this is only the beginning of a sketch of how the meaning of calls
could evolve. Importantly, there is no reason to assume that the ‘selection’ among
different strategies is genetic, especially since there is no evidence of a relevant
genetic difference between Tai and Tiwai monkeys; the competition must thus be
among strategies that the monkeys use in various communicative encounters, with
greater or lesser success.
Several remarks should be added.
– If on average leopard-appropriate reactions yield a higher pay-off than eagle-
appropriate reactions, \Rtrivial, Strivial[ won’t be a Nash equilibrium any more,
not even a weak one: the receiver will have an incentive to use Rdistinct, since as
a reaction to Strivial this will lead it to adopt the superior leopard-appropriate
reaction. And once \Rdistinct, Strivial[ becomes prevalent, \Rdistinct, Sdistinct[
will soon come to dominate.
– If players are allowed to adapt their strategy to the type of the partner in the
communication game, it is clear that mutants that play an optimal strategy
against non-mutants but play \Rdistinct, Sdistinct[ against each other will invade
a non-mutant, non-discriminating \Rtrivial, Rtrivial[ population (as the mutants
will do strictly better than the non-mutants when they encounter a mutant). This
holds even if eagle-appropriate responses are on average better than leopard-
appropriate responses.
– We only discussed game-theoretic mechanisms of evolution, but more
traditional mechanisms of linguistic re-analysis (used to explain the historical
evolution of linguistic forms) could potentially be explored as well. We leave
this issue for future research.
5.4.3 Architectural considerations
The lexicalist analysis of the Tai vs. Tiwai contrast leaves important questions open:
why is krak ambiguous between krak1 and krak2? And why is the input to the
derivation of the meaning of krak-oo the innate meaning krak1 rather than the
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acquired meaning krak2?35 On the assumption that there is dialectal variation across
Tai vs. Tiwai in the meaning of krak, one might expect that in a given dialect krak
gets the same meaning in all of its uses. But this is not what we find: to derive the
proper meaning for krak-oo in Tai, we are forced to posit an ambiguity.
Furthermore, the same ambiguity might be necessary to derive the more fine-
grained data which suggest that even in Tai krak sometimes has non-leopard-related
uses, ones that are not reducible to whatever amount of ‘noise’ there is in the data
for other alarm calls.
We take this complex situation to motivate the development of an alternative
analysis.
6 A pragmatic analysis
The main difficulty with our lexicalist analysis was that it had to posit an ambiguity
(between krak1 and krak2) within the Tai dialect. Here we will develop an
alternative analysis in which the ambiguity is not lexical in nature, but rather derives
from a general option of pragmatic strengthening. Specifically, we will now assume
that all meanings are innate, but that there are rules of competition among calls: all
else being equal, the more specific (= logically stronger) call compatible with a
situation is preferred. The rule applies maximally, but on Tiwai it yields a nearly
contradictory meaning (akin to ‘dangerous ground predator’, in a situation in which
there are no such predators); and for this reason the rule fails to apply.
This line of analysis is in effect based on the notion of scalar implicatures
developed in recent linguistics (see for instance Chierchia et al., 2012 and
Schlenker, to appear, for recent surveys). In fact, as is standard in recent formal
work, we will have to specify in our analysis the formal alternatives of the calls of
interest. Thus in neo-Gricean analyses of implicatures (e.g. Horn 1972), one derives
from It’s possible that John is the culprit an inference that one is not in a position to
assert that it’s certain that John is the culprit (on the assumption that certain is an
alternative to possible). Since this inference is not lexically encoded, one fully
expects that in some cases possible should be used without an implicature—as when
one says that it’s possible, and in fact certain, that John is the culprit. By similar
reasoning, we will devise a system in which in Tai krak has a (non-contradictory)
strengthened meaning akin to dangerous ground predator; but we will assume that
strengthening need not systematically apply, which will explain why in a few cases
krak appears to have its broader meaning of general alarm.
Going back to possible, the scalar analysis of the not certain inference has an
additional advantage: it explains why the derived noun possibility behaves like the
adjective possible in allowing for a reading in which the relevant state involves
possibility and certainty. By contrast, a simple lexical analysis of the inference
would predict that possibility refers to the state of being possible but not certain.
35 As mentioned at the end of Sect. 5.2, if we allow krak-oo to be derived both from krak1 and from
krak2, the question becomes: why is krak2 dominant when krak occurs as an independent word, while
krak1 is dominant in krak-oo derivations?
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In some cases, this would make incorrect predictions. For instance, in the sentence
Whenever there is a possibility that a politician is corrupt, he should resign, the
proposed meaning would fail to entail anything about politicians who are known to
be corrupt, contrary to intuition.36 No problem arises if the words possible and
possibility both involve a notion that does not exclude certainty (and trigger
additional pragmatic inferences when competition with the words certain and
certainty is taken into account). By the same token, the meaning of krak-oo will
naturally be derived from the lexical meaning of krak, and for this reason it will not
have a ‘ground predator’ component, since the latter is obtained for krak by an
implicature-like phenomenon. This will explain why in Tai and on Tiwai alike krak-
oo has a meaning of general alarm.
One point bears mentioning at the outset. While initial studies of implicatures tied
them to a theory of communicative rationality (e.g. Grice 1975), far less than full-
fledged rationality is needed to obtain a mechanism of competition; all that is needed is
a—possibly automatic, unconscious, and non-rational—optimization device by which
more informative calls ‘suppress’ less informative ones. By no means should one
assume that a pragmatic analysis of the meaning of some calls commits us to strong
claims about the level of rationality achieved by Campbell’s monkeys.
6.1 General ideas
Before we get into technicalities, it is worth sketching our account in general terms.
The key pragmatic ideas are informally stated in (46); our basic assumption is that
krak is unambiguous, and always has a meaning of general alert.
(46) a. Pragmatic Scales
{krak, krak-oo, hok, hok-oo} are alternatives to each other
b. Strengthened meanings
For every word w, the strengthened version of w is written as w and its
meaning is equivalent to
w and not w1 and not w2 and …
where w1, w2 are alternatives to w and are more informative (logically stronger)
than w.
Let us see informally how this analysis works. First, the competition between krak and
hok/hok-oo will have the effect that the general alarm meaning of krak will be enriched
into krak and not hok and not hok-oo. Thus if hok has a meaning of aerial predator, the
strengthened meaning krak will trigger an inference such as: not involving an aerial
predator (we will refine the meaning of hok along the lines of (43)b above, hence this is
36 There are simpler cases in which the ‘not certain’ inference is removed, as in the following sentence,
found in an online forum:
(i) There is always a possibility—in fact a certainty—that people will make bad choices. (accessed on
02/09/2013 on http://forums.welltrainedmind.com/topic/210340-stategovt-regulation-of-hs-good-or-bad/
page__st__50)
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just a first approximation). Still, this isn’t quite enough to give krak a strengthened
meaning that ends up referring to ground predators. This is where the second
competitor, krak-oo, enters the picture. Our analysis is in two steps.
– First, we will revise the analysis of the meaning of -oo given in (28)/(47)a and
replace it with that in (47)b.
(47) Meaning of –oo
a. Original analysis
For any root R different from boom-boom for any situation s,
IM,s(R–oo) = 1 iff in s there is a disturbance that licenses the same attentional
state as if IM,s(R) = 1, or in other words: in s there is a disturbance that
licenses the same attentional state as situations s’ such that IM,s’(R) = 1.
b. Revised analysis (preliminary)
For any root R different from boom-boom and for any situation s,
IM,s(R–oo) = 1 iff in s there is a disturbance which licenses R but is not strong
among the disturbances that license R.
The reason for this change is that according to (28)/(47)a the meaning of krak-oo is
strictly weaker than that of krak, and thus krak could not yield an implicature of the
form not krak-oo, on pain of contradiction. In (47)b, -oo is given the semantic
function of an attenuator, but its logical contribution is such that R-oo is logically
stronger than R: if there is a disturbance that is not strong among those that license
R, then a fortiori there is a disturbance that licenses R (just not one that is strong!).
– When this revised meaning is taken into account, we will obtain the desired
effect once the meaning of krak as in (41)a is combined with the implicatures
triggered due to competition with both hok and krak-oo: from the competition with
hok, we obtain the inference that the disturbance is not related to an aerial predator;
and from the competition with krak-oo, we get the inference that the disturbance is
strong—in other words, krak gets the pragmatic meaning of a disturbance which is
strong and which is not related to an aerial predator.
– We will argue that the optional strengthening fails to apply on Tiwai because it
would yield a contradiction relative to that environment, since there are no
dangerous ground predators, and hence probably no dangerous ground disturbances,
on the island.
– This isn’t quite the end of the story, however. For given the conjunctive semantics
we gave for concatenation in (21), we will incorrectly predict a contradictory meaning
for the numerous sequences in which krak-oo co-occurs (and often follows) a more
urgent alarm call. Consider for instance one of the types of calls listed in (10)e, uttered
in an eagle-related situation, and made of a series of krak-oo, followed by a series of
hok, followed again by a series of krak-oo, as shown in (48):
(48) K*h*K*
The hok component of the sequence is often indicative of an eagle. But our
conjunctive semantics will incorrectly yield a meaning roughly similar to: there is a
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weak disturbance and there is an aerial predator. But one would think that the
presence of an eagle is certainly not a weak disturbance, hence the meaning might
end up being entirely misleading.
A natural solution is to relativize the truth-conditional contribution of meanings
to a precise time of utterance, and to the state of mind of the caller. The basic
intuition is that the various calls convey information about the caller’s state of mind
at the time of that call’s utterance; and this state could well change quickly (and
possibly as a result of the call, if the speaker happens to ‘discharge’ a certain level
of alarm as he conveys it to others; the details of such an analysis would need to be
worked out, however). On such a view, we avoid assigning misleading truth
conditions to (48) because the caller may signal the presence of an eagle at time t
while conveying a weak alarm at some later time t?k (or for that matter at some
earlier time). Technically, we will add a time parameter to all of our analyses, as is
illustrated for -oo in (49):
(49) Meaning of -oo—Revised Analysis
For any root R different from boom-boom, for any situation s, and for any
time t,
IM,s,t(R–oo) = 1 iff in s at t there is a disturbance which licenses R but is not
strong among the disturbances that license R.
6.2 Analysis
As announced, we now introduce a time parameter t to make it clear that the
meaning of any word corresponds to the utterer’s state of information at the time of
utterance t. As it turns out, however, the time parameter can replace the alarm
parameter. This is because the function of the alarm parameter was solely to ‘count’
the number of calls that appeared in a sequence. By adopting a discrete view of the
time parameter, one in which if a call is evaluated at time t, the next call is evaluated
at t?1, we can emulate the effects of the alarm parameter solely with the time
parameter. The intuition is straightforward: the longer a monkey calls, the more
serious the alarm; and to assess how long a monkey calls, we can certainly rely on
the time parameter.
Both the lexical interpretation function I and its extension [[ . ]] are thus endowed
with a time parameter, hence notations such as IM,s,t(k) and [[k]]
M,s,t relative to
model M, situation s and time t.
6.2.1 Semantics
The lexical semantics was informally introduced above and is recapitulated in more
precise form in (50), with an explicit relativization to the time of the call and the
state of mind of the caller.
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(50) Lexical Semantics
For any model M, situation s and time t,
-Roots
a. IM, s, t(krak) = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance
b. IM, s, t(hok) = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance whose
source is non-terrestrial
c. IM, s, t(boom-boom) = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance but
not of a predator
-Affix
d. for any root R,
IM, s, t(R–oo) = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance that licenses
R and isn’t strong among disturbances that license R.
Given these rules, we can immediately compute the meanings of krak-oo and
hok-oo:
(51) a. IM,s,t(krak–oo) = 1 iff at time t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance
that licenses krak and isn’t strong among
disturbances that license krak,
iff at time t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance
that isn’t strong among all disturbances.
b. IM,s,t(hok–oo) = 1 iff at time t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance
that licenses hok and isn’t strong among
disturbances that license hok,
iff at time t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance
whose source is non-terrestrial, and which isn’t
strong among those whose source is non-
terrestrial.
As mentioned, in our compositional rules the time parameter now replaces the
alarm parameter; since we want to compute the elapsed time between a call and the
beginning of the sequence, we assume that the situation parameter s provides
information about the time of the first call, so that the equivalent of the ‘alarm’ level
at time t can be computed by considering the value of t-time(s), where time(s) is of
course the time of the situation s (= the time at the start of the sequence). This is
defined in (52), where we have made explicit all parameters:
(52) Compositional Semantics (with a time parameter replacing the alarm
parameter)
For any model M, situation s (whose time of occurrence is time(s)), time t,
word w, and string S,
a. [[w]] M, s, t = 1 iff IM,s,t(w) = 1 and the alarm level is
37 at least t-time(s).
b. [[w S]] M, s, t = 1 iff [[w]]M,s,t = 1 and [[S]]M,s,t?1 = 1
37 We could relativize this further by having: … the caller of s is aware of an alarm level of at least t-
time(s). This further relativization won’t bring much, however.
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As an example, we can compute the meaning of the sequence hok krak-oo, which
would have come out as contradictory if we hadn’t relativized meanings to times
(we assume that time(s) = 0).
(53) [[hok krak-oo]]M,s,0 = 1 iff [[hok]]M,s,0 = 1 and [[krak-oo]]M,s,1 = 1,
iff [IM,s,0(hok) = 1 and the alarm level is at least
(0-time(s))] and [IM, s, 1(krak-oo) = 1 and the
alarm level is at least 1-time(s)],
iff IM, s, 0(hok) = 1 and IM, s, 1(krak-oo) = 1 and the
alarm level is at least 1,
iff at time 0 the caller of s is alert to a disturbance
whose source is non-terrestrial and at time 1 the
caller of s is alert to a disturbance that isn’t strong
among those that license krak and the alarm level
is at least 1.
In effect, this two-call sequence has three effects at once: it signals the presence of
an aerial disturbance at time 0; it signals that the caller’s state of mind has turned to
a less serious threat at time 1; and the number of calls provides information about
the level of alarm, which should be of at least 1.
For this model to make sense, it should be the case that a Campbell’s monkey that is
alert to a serious threat—say to an eagle—will not necessarily remain in a state of
alertness to that threat, but may go through states of lower and more general alarm. This
assumption (which would require some independent motivation) is stated in (54).
(54) Auxiliary assumption: alertness
If in a situation s a sequence is triggered at time t by a certain threat, the caller
of s might go at times t0 [ t through lower states of alarm than what is
licensed by the threat, and this might get reflected in the calling sequence.
6.2.2 Pragmatics
We already introduced our motivation for positing the set of alternatives in (55)a.
The refinement in (55)b, where Ø stands for the null string, is intended to allow a
sequence without boom boom in initial position to yield the inference that one might
be in a predation context; for instance, a sequence krak krak-oo will evoke the
alternative boom-boom krak krak-oo. The latter is stronger than the former, hence
the pragmatic meaning of krak krak-oo will trigger the inference that the speaker is
not in a position to assert that the situation is not one of predation, and thus that the
situation might be or is one of predation.38 Importantly, the rest of this analysis can
38 The distinction between ‘might be a situation of predation’ and ‘is a situation of predation’ pertains to
the difference between primary implicatures (yielding: the speaker is not in a position to assert boom-
boom, hence the speaker is not in a position to assert that the situation is not one of predation) and
secondary implicatures (yielding: the speaker believes that the situation is not one of predation). We
disregard this distinction in what follows (see for instance Schlenker, to appear, for a recent survey).
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be developed without the refinement in (55)b; the crucial hypothesis for what
follows is just (55)a.39
(55) Alternatives
a. krak, krak-oo, hok, hok-oo are alternatives to each other
b. Ø, boom-boom are alternatives to each other (hence the absence of boom-
boom gives rise to the inference that one might be in a predation context)
Now the key to obtain the desired results is to compute appropriate strengthened
meanings; (56) recapitulates with our ‘official’ notation the informal presentation
that was made in (46)b.40
(56) Strengthened meanings
For every word w, we write as w the strengthened version of w, and take its
meaning to be given by:
for all situation s and time t,
[[w]] M, s, t = 1 iff [[w]] M, s, t = 1 and for all w0 [ Alt(w), if w0 asymmetrically
entails w, [[w0]] M, s, t = 0
where Alt(w) is the set of alternatives of w.
Importantly, as is usually assumed in the pragmatics of human language, the
relevant notion of entailment is contextual entailment, which in the present context
can be reduced to entailment given what is known about/holds true in the site of the
utterance, assimilated here to the model M of evaluation.41
(57) Contextual entailment
A word w’ (contextually) entails a word w at site w relative to a model M just
in case for every situation s in M, for every time t, if [[w0]] M, s, t = 1, then
[[w]] M, s, t = 1.
For future reference, we also define the notion of a (contextual) contradiction in the
natural way:
39 An anonymous referee correctly points out that (55)b makes the unusual claim (from the standpoint of
human language) that a null string can compete with a full expression to yield an implicature. The referee
further notes that one might do without this assumption and just assume that on cognitive grounds the
monkeys always consider predation to be a possibility, unless they hear boom boom. If so, we could do
without (55)b.
40 In standard neo-Gricean treatments of scalar implicatures (e.g. Horn 1972), the utterance of a sentence
S implicates the falsity of its stronger alternatives; the intuitive motivation was that for any alternative S’
stronger than S, it would have been more cooperative of the speaker to utter S’ than S if he had believed S’
to be true. By contrast, in more recent treatments (surveyed for instance in Chierchia et al., 2012, and
Schlenker, to appear), the utterance of S implicates the falsity of any alternative S’ that is not weaker than
S. While there appear to be strong empirical arguments for defining implicatures in this second way, it is
not entirely clear how it should be derived from a more general theory of rationality or optimization. In
the present piece, we stick to the standard neo-Gricean view of implicatures.
41 See Magri (2009) for an extended argument that implicatures in human language should instead be
viewed in a context-independent way.
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(58) Contextual contradiction
A word w is a (contextual) contradiction relative to a model M just in case for
every situation s in M, for every time t, [[w]] M, s, t = 0.
Since strengthened meanings are derived by reference to entailment relations
among calls, it is worth representing these explicitly. In the representation in (59), a
word w is above a word w0 of the class {krak, krak-oo, hok, hok-oo} just in case it is
more informative than it.
(59)
krak
krak-oo hok
hok-oo
Some explanations might be in order.
– Given our semantics for -oo, it immediately follows that a modified root R-oo
always entails the bare root R.
– In addition, hok—and thus also the stronger hok-oo—entails krak: if the caller is
alert to a disturbance whose source is non-terrestrial, then certainly the caller is
alert to a disturbance.
– Are there further entailments? Not if the contribution of -oo in R-oo (‘… weak
among the disturbances that license R’) is understood in a natural, non-
intersective way, for instance as: ‘… is a disturbance in the bottom n%, in terms
of threat level, among the disturbances that license R’. In particular, without
special assumptions, there is no entailment relation between krak-oo and hok-oo.
If krak-oo is used, then the caller is alert to a disturbance that counts as weak
among all general disturbances; but this need not imply that the caller is alert to
a disturbance that counts as weak among all those whose source is non-
terrestrial. For instance, if aerial disturbances usually involve eagles, an inter-
group encounter might count as a weak disturbance (e.g. in the bottom 10% of
aerial threats); but this need not entail that it counts as weak among all the
disturbances there are, as many of the non-aerial disturbances might be
considerably less threatening than eagle encounters (hence an inter-group
encounter might fail to be in the bottom 10% of all threats).
Based on the entailment relations in (59), it is easy to compute the strengthened
meanings of the calls krak, krak-oo, hok, and hok-oo. (Since we are primarily
interested in krak and its competitors, we do not repeat here the inferences
obtained due to the competition—at the beginning of sequences—between Ø and
boom-boom.)
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Some comments are in order.
– Given the entailment relations represented in (59), it is immediate that the
strengthened meanings of krak-oo and hok-oo are identical to their lexical
meanings.42
(60) On the assumption that the entailment relations represented in (59) are the
only ones that hold among {krak, krak-oo, hok, hok-oo}, the strengthened
meanings of these calls are:
for every model M, situation s and time t,
a. [[krak-oo]]M,s,t = [[krak-oo]]M,s,t (since no other call entails krak-oo)
= 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance
that isn’t strong among those that license krak,
= 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance
that isn’t strong among all disturbances.
b. [[hok-oo]]M,s,t = [[hok-oo]]M,s,t (since no other call entails hok-oo)
= 1 iff at time t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance
that isn’t strong among those whose source is
non-terrestrial (from (51)b).
c. [[hok]]M, s, t = 1 iff [[hok]]M,s,t = 1 and [[hok-oo]]M,s,t = 0
(since hok-oo entails hok)
= 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance
whose source is non-terrestrial but not to a disturbance
that is isn’t strong among all disturbances whose source
is non-terrestrial,
or roughly: = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a serious aerial
disturbance.
d. [[krak]]M,s,t = 1 iff [[krak]]M,s,t = 1 and [[krak-oo]]M,s,t = 0
and [[hok]]M,s,t = 0 and [[hok-oo]]M,s,t = 0
(since krak-oo, hok and hok-oo all entail krak)
= 1 iff [[krak]]M,s,t = 1 and [[krak-oo]]M,s,t = 0
and [[hok]]M,s,t = 0 (since hok is weaker than
hok-oo)
= 1 at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance but not to
one that is weak among all disturbances and not to one
whose source is non-terrestrial
or roughly: = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a terrestrial
disturbance which is serious among all disturbances.
42 Note that it would be an undesirable result if the strengthened meaning of krak-oo implied the falsity
of hok-oo, as this would predict that when strengthening is applied (which for reasons we’ll come to
should be in most cases), krak-oo cannot appear in cases of weak non-terrestrial threat. This does not
appear to be correct: as seen in (13) and (27), krak-oo appears in almost all triggering environments,
including those that involve falling trees or inter-group encounters (in the Tai dataset used in Ouattara
et al. 2009a, b; the one exception is the ‘cohesion and travel’ context, which only triggers boom boom in
this dataset).
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– The strengthened meaning of hok is predicted to only apply to serious aerial
disturbances, whereas hok-oo is predicted to apply to non-strong disturbances
only. Given the auxiliary assumption in (54), we would expect hok-oo to have a
broader domain of application than the strengthened meaning of hok. As
mentioned earlier, in the Tai dataset used by Ouattara et al. (2009a, b), hok-oo is
systematically used in inter-group encounters, while in such situations hok isn’t
used. But there are also cases in which hok has a broader distribution than hok-
oo, as we mentioned in Sect. 3.2—a point we leave for future research.
– The strengthened meaning of krak is predicted to apply only to serious terrestrial
disturbances. On the assumption that strenghtening is applied in most cases (but
not always), we obtain two desirable results. First, usually krak is used as a
leopard alarm call in Tai, as leopards are presumably the most common serious
terrestrial disturbance. Second, we also account for the marginal cases in which
krak is used with a meaning of general alarm. Note that in this respect the
situation is not symmetric between krak and hok: the lexical meaning of hok
involves non-terrestrial threats, hence with or without strengthening hok is
predicted not to apply to terrestrial threats. By contrast, the lexical meaning of
krak is unspecific, hence when strengthening fails to be applied non-terrestrial
uses can be obtained.
– We noted in our initial analysis that boom boom … hok … was predicted to be a
contradiction. But this was because we had initially treated hok as being
lexically eagle-related (in (25), and then again in (41)b). By contrast, in the
present model, the lexical meaning of hok only entails that the speaker is alert to
a disturbance whose source is non-terrestrial (as in (50)b). In order to get
something like a contradiction for boom boom … hok…, we must assume that it
is the strengthened meaning of hok which is used, as in (60)c. (Note that the
hypothesis that strengthening occurs very often is also needed to account for the
fact that in Tai krak usually has a ground predator function.)
6.3 Tai vs. Tiwai
It remains to account for the difference between Tai and Tiwai in the use of krak.
Since the lexical meaning of krak (general alert) seems to be appropriate for Tiwai,
we will argue that there strengthening fails to be applied because it yields a
‘contextual contradiction’. Let us develop this idea in greater detail.
In our initial analysis, the distinction was analyzed in lexical terms—with the
consequence that the meaning of one call, krak, couldn’t be entirely innate. In the
present analysis, no such hypothesis is needed; to the contrary, we will assume that
the very same linguistic rules apply at the two sites, but that strengthening is
constrained in a way that interacts with the environment. Specifically, strengthening
fails to apply in a situation s of a site M if it yields a contextual contradiction
relative to M. In addition, we should posit that strengthening otherwise applies in
most cases, since we only found few instances of krak in non-leopard-related
situations in Tai. Both assumptions are stated in (61).
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(61) Strengthening application and strengthening avoidance
a. If at a site M, for every situation s in M, for every time t, [[w]] M, s, t = 0,
one should interpret an utterance of w without strengthening.
b. Otherwise, a word w should in most cases be interpreted as [[w]] .
This natural condition is the source of the difference between Tai and Tiwai. In
Tai, the strengthened meaning of krak can clearly be used in leopard situations. On
Tiwai, things are presumably different: for lack of ground predators, the resulting
meaning is contradictory, and for this reason krak is always used with its lexical
meaning only.43
Importantly, hok remains unaffected by the rules of strengthening avoidance: the
strengthened meaning of hok pertains to serious aerial disturbances, as seen in (60)c,
and these do exist on Tiwai (in particular because of the existence of eagles). Hence
strengthening should be applied; furthermore, even if it were not, hok does not have
a general alarm meaning, hence it should always be related to some aerial
disturbance.
Needless to say, various refinements could and should be explored. For instance,
it might be useful to modify our condition of strengthening avoidance in such a way
that it makes reference to ‘near-contradictions’ rather than ‘contradictions’. A
(contextual) near-contradiction could be taken to be an expression E such that for
almost all situations s in M, for almost all times t, [[E]] M, s, t = 0).
Importantly, in the present analysis it is predicted that krak-oo should have the
same meaning at both sites. This is because the one source of variation we have
postulated concerns the use of strengthening, which gets blocked when it is
contradictory. But as we saw in (60), the strengthened meaning of krak-oo is
identical to its literal meaning at both sites, and thus no source of variation can be
found here. Furthermore, the meaning for krak-oo obtained from the compositional
combination of krak and -oo seems to be adequate, as it involves a general alarm
whose level is relatively weak.
6.4 The import of the compositional analysis of -oo
We asked in Sect. 5.3.2 what was the import of the compositional treatment of -oo
for the Lexicalist Analysis. The same question can be asked about the Pragmatic
Analysis. Like its lexicalist competitor, the present analysis draws a connection
between (i) a theory-internal issue with respect to the Tai data, (ii) a fine-grained
empirical problem in the Tai data, and (iii) a dialectal comparison between Tai and
Tiwai. (i) As in the Lexicalist Analysis, the theory-internal issue derives from the
assumption that the meanings of krak-oo and hok-oo are computed from the
meaning of -oo combined with the meaning of krak and hok respectively. But now
instead of solving the problem by positing an ambiguity in krak, we posited that
krak has a unique meaning of general alarm, and that the meaning of krak-oo is
43 Note that it is crucial in this analysis that strengthening should work in the same way in Tai and on
Tiwai—with the effect that no strengthening can take place on Tiwai. If we allowed fewer alternatives to
be negated on Tiwai than in Tai, contradiction avoidance would not suffice to explain why strengthening
does not take place. We leave a deeper investigation of this point for future research.
Monkey semantics 489
123
derived from that meaning. Importantly, our competition rules strengthen the
meaning of calls rather than of roots. It is for this reason that the call krak obtains a
strengthened meaning (by virtue of competition with krak-oo and hok, as in (59)),
whereas krak-oo isn’t expected to be strengthened in a similar way (for reasons
discussed after (59)). (ii) As in the Lexicalist Analysis, the fine-grained empirical
problem lies in the existence of unstrengthened uses of krak in Tai; from the present
perspective, this is not due to an ambiguity of krak, but rather to the optionality of
the strengthening rule. (iii) Finally, the import of the dialectal comparison is that
once we have posited a general meaning for krak and a rule of strengthening, we can
explain why the latter fails to apply on Tiwai, as it would give rise to a contextual
(near-)contradiction. As we noted in our earlier discussions, a non-compositional
analysis of -oo would have more degrees of liberty than the compositional
alternative we adopted, hence the results we obtained could be emulated by a non-
compositional analysis of krakoo and hokoo, though without the logical connection
between (i) and (ii). By contrast, our rule of strengthening does not rely on the
compositional analysis of -oo, but just on the existence of a competition between
krak, krak-oo, and hok-oo, irrespective of how their meanings were obtained; thus
the specifically pragmatic part of the analysis could be reproduced without
explanatory loss in a non-compositional analysis of -oo.
7 Alternative theories
For clarity, we have focused our discussion on just two theories of the Tai vs. Tiwai
distinction. The first one was appealing by its simplicity: krak has different
meanings at the two sites, and this shows that not all of the call semantics is innate.
The second theory was more sophisticated and possibly superior; it posited that krak
has the same meaning of general alarm at the two sites, and that this meaning can in
principle be strengthened by the same pragmatic rule at the two sites—but due to the
ecological difference between the two sites (= the absence of ground predator at
Tiwai), the strengthening rule yields a contradiction and thus fails to be applied on
the island. Still, there are alternative theoretical directions that ought to be explored
in future research.
Let us step back to see what should be the main ingredients of a successful
account. For clarity, it is useful to classify theories along two main dimensions,
pertaining to (i) what the semantic operations provide information about; (ii) what
types of informational operations there are, and which are subject to variation.
(i) Situation-sensitive or site-sensitive semantics?
To classify theories with respect to the first dimension, we ask whether the
informational content of the various semantic operations is sensitive to (a) the
general properties of the site at which the speaker lives (formally analyzed in terms
of a model parameter M), or (b) the narrow situation (with an approaching leopard,
or an eagle, or a falling tree) in which the calls were uttered (formally, the situation
parameter s). Let us illustrate.
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– The lexical meanings we postulated in this piece all pertain to the narrow
situation of utterance (written as s). But different theories could be explored in
which this is not so. For instance, a call w could be taken to have a meaning akin
to: the most dangerous known predator relative to M.44 For this expression to
refer in a situation s, there must be a predator in s. But which predator it is will
depend on properties of the site at large: hypothetically, the most dangerous
predator in Tai might be the leopard, whereas it might the eagle on Tiwai (for
lack of leopards!). A theory with rich meanings of this sort could in principle
account for the Tai vs. Tiwai contrast on the basis of entirely innate, but site-
sensitive meanings. (Note that a meaning akin to the least dangerous predator
would be site-sensitive in exactly the same way as the most dangerous predator;
and in the case at hand this lexical entry might yield more adequate results, as
leopards are arguably less dangerous than eagles.)
– The pragmatic operation of strengthening used in our pragmatic theory was
sensitive to the site of utterance, since we claimed that strengthening fails to
apply if it yields a contextually contradictory meaning. Crucially, however, the
notion of ‘contextual contradiction’ was defined relative to a model M, i.e.
relative to a site. In this way, the prohibition against contradictory strength-
enings amounted to an indirect way of taking the site of utterance into account—
and this is the reason this second analysis was able to account for the contrast
between Tai and Tiwai on the basis of the very same semantics and pragmatics
for the two sites.
(ii) Semantics, pragmatics or cognitive state?
To classify theories along the second dimension, we ask what types of informational
operations there are, and which are subject to variation. The information conveyed
could be derived from (a) the semantic content of calls [= the literal meaning as
encoded by the compositional semantics]; (b) their pragmatic content [= the
semantic content together with additional inferences obtained by considering why
the speaker uttered one call rather than another one]; and (c) inferences about the
cognitive state that led the speaker to say something to begin with. To illustrate: (a)
in our lexical theory the action was entirely in the semantic component, which was
subject to variation, since we posited a dialectal difference in the meaning of krak
between Tai and Tiwai (krak had a leopard meaning in Tai but not on Tiwai). (b) In
our pragmatic theory, the semantics wasn’t subject to variation but superficially the
pragmatics was, since strengthening could be applied in Tai but not on Tiwai.45 (c)
Finally, in our initial discussion of Diana monkeys, we saw that Tiwai males called
differently to leopard growls than their Tai cousins, but that the difference was
plausibly cognitive in nature: not knowing what leopards are, Tiwai males
assimilate them to general disturbances, and display the corresponding calling
44 This possibility was mentioned in discussion by Paul Egre´.
45 We write ‘superficially’ because the pragmatic rules were taken to be the same at the two sites:
strengthening was taken to apply in most cases unless it yielded a contextual contradiction. It was because
of the ecological difference between the two sites that strengthening failed to apply to krak on Tiwai.
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behavior; neither semantic nor pragmatic variation was needed to explain this
difference.46
It is worth repeating what will not work: a theory in which (1) the informational
content of the various elements above is solely dependent on the narrow situation of
utterance, and (2) no semantic operation is subject to variation across sites. Given
the auxiliary assumption that eagle situations are the same (in relevant respects) in
Tai and on Tiwai, such a theory would predict that the same calls are heard in such
situations on both sites—and our starting point was precisely that this is empirically
incorrect. Thus the conjunction of (1) and (2) appears to be too strong. In our first
theory, the conjunction didn’t hold because (2) was false: the lexical meaning of
krak was in fact subject to variation. In our second theory, (2) was true, but (1)
wasn’t: meaning strengthening was indirectly dependent on the site rather than just
on the situation of utterance.47
8 Conclusion
8.1 The import of a semantic analysis
While we provided a synthetic analysis of the Tai and Tiwai data, and tried to give a
fair hearing both to a lexical and to a pragmatic analysis, we could have presented
things in a more striking (and more dogmatic) fashion.
Let us start from the Tai data. Superficially, it might appear that krak has a
leopard-related meaning. But three considerations militate against this conclusion.
First, if krak-oo is derived from krak, and if -oo has a constant meaning in all its
46 We could try to posit that the site-sensitivity of the system lies entirely in the decision to utter calls.
For instance, krak might have a constant meaning of ‘high alert’ at both sites. Suppose now that leopards
are the most dangerous predators there are in Tai; monkeys would judge that the ‘high alert’ call is worth
using only for the most dangerous predator. On Tiwai, since there is only one predator, they might use it
freely. In effect, this is a site-sensitive rule to utter a call, one which implements in non-linguistic terms
the kind of site-sensitive meanings we discussed above when raising the possibility that krak might mean
something like the most dangerous predator.
47 One question we did not address is whether semantics/pragmatics or some other system should be used
to account for our data. An anonymous referee suggests that ‘blocking by specificity’ could be an
alternative—for instance with krak specified as [?disturbance] and hok as [?disturbance, ? aerial]. But
we take this suggestion to lead to a dilemma.
– If the principle is understood as it is in morphology, it typically presupposes a framework in which
syntactic trees are fully specified in terms of features, and lexical items ‘compete for insertion’ into
syntactic nodes according to the specificity rule. For instance, in the English third person present, a
syntactic node could have the features [?3rd, -plural, -feminine, ?present]; the null ending -Ø
specified as [?present] and the ending -s specified as [?3rd, -plural, ?present] can both be inserted,
but the latter wins out due to the specificity rule (a particularly clear framework that works along these
lines is Distributed Morphology—e.g. Halle and Marantz 1994). We see no reason to posit a feature-
based syntax in the case of the monkey languages under study, hence this model doesn’t seem to be
directly applicable.
– Alternatively, we could take the specificity rule to be computed relative to the information state of the
speaker (rather than the features present in a syntactic tree). But then it seems to be just a
terminological variant of the implicature-based analysis we have been developing.
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uses (i.e. is given a compositional treatment), it is very unlikely that krak could have
such a narrow meaning given that krak-oo is used as a general alarm. Second, this
conclusion appears to be supported by the fact that there are a few general alarm
uses of krak. Third, the pattern this leads to is one which is reminiscent of the
division of labor between calls in other primate species, with a raptor-specific alarm
call, and a general alarm call used, among others, for ground predators (as will be
recalled, this was the pattern discussed in Wheeler and Fischer 2012). From that
perspective, the Tiwai data are a beautiful confirmation of the theory, since there
krak really does have the distribution of a general alarm call.
Importantly, one key ingredient in this analysis was the assumption that krak-oo
is derived from krak: this element of compositionality at the word level turned out to
impose constraints on the meaning of krak (at least if we want the meaning of -oo to
be reasonably natural). This, in turn, made it possible to make it not-too-surprising
that at some sites (Tiwai) krak is in fact used as a general alarm call.
In this way, there is a subtle interaction between empirical and theory-internal
constraints (here: compositionality at the world level). Of course this is just the very
beginning of what should become a research program; there is no doubt that as we
learn more we will acquire more refined data to constrain our models.
8.2 Open questions
We conclude with a list of problems for future research.
8.2.1 Refinements
– Our main line of reasoning is very sensitive to ecological assumptions.
Specifically, both of our theories were based on the hypothesis that eagle
situations are not significantly different in Tai and on Tiwai. While we do not
currently know of any strong reason to think that eagles or their hunting
strategies are significantly different across Tai and Tiwai, this ecological
question could be revisited in future research—which might have consequences
for the linguistic analysis.
– Similarly, we assumed that genetic differences between Tai and Tiwai
Campbell’s monkeys were unlikely to be responsible for differences we found
in calling behavior—but we do not have genetic data to back up this point,
which could thus be revisited in future research.48
– The two theories we developed do not make quite the same predictions about
male Campbell’s monkeys with atypical life experiences. Two cases could
theoretically be informative.
48 An interesting point of comparison in future research could be afforded by Mona monkeys, which are
phylogenetically close to Campbell’s monkeys (Guschanski et al. 2013) and display variation across sites
(e.g. West Africa vs. Grenada)—with a genetic history which has been studied in some detail (Glenn
1996; Horsburgh et al. 2002).
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• Imagine first that a Campbell’s monkey M from Tiwai island was translocated
to the Tai forest. According to the Lexicalist theory, M will continue to use krak
as a general alarm call (and hence to use it to call to eagles), up until the time he
will have learned the dialect of other males. By contrast, the Pragmatic theory
might predict that as soon as M has learned from the environment that there are
dangerous ground predators, he might start using the ‘strengthened’ meaning of
krak, and hence to (largely) restrict its use to leopards.
• Now imagine that a Campbell’s monkey M0 is raised in captivity. The
Lexicalist theory would predict that his initial uses of krak would be general,
but that he might learn the leopard meaning if exposed to it. The Pragmatic
theory leads one to expect that as soon as (i) the competing calls hok and
krak-oo are used with their standard meaning, and (ii) there are ground
predators, krak should be primarily used with its strengthened meaning
(because pragmatic strengthening is taken to be an innate property of the
system, whose effects are blocked only in case it yields a (near-)
contradiction relative to the environment).
Needless to say, these predictions are sensitive to many theoretical details
that could be challenged; and even if correct, they might prove hard or
impossible to test.
– The primatology literature is heavily concerned with the distinction between
referential and non-referential calls. We have not fully addressed this issue, as it
is usually hard to distinguish between, say, an ‘eagle’ meaning, and a meaning
akin to ‘serious threat whose source is aerial’; in fact, we went back and forth
between the two types of rules in our own analysis of the meaning of hok.
– We excluded wak from the present analysis, in part because its delineation
from hok isn’t obvious. But this should be explored in future research.49
– As Stephanie Harves (p.c.) pointed out, one should in the future explore more
closely the connection between the alarm parameter we posited (which is
raised by each call) and the effect of -oo. In our Lexicalist analysis, -oo just
broadens the meaning of a root, which is compatible with high alarm
parameters. But in the Pragmatic theory, the effect of R-oo is to assert that there
is a weak R-type alert—which might lead one to expect that krak-oo should not
appear in long sequences. Given our data, this seems to be incorrect.50
49 The presence of two distinct alarm calls to warn of eagle presence is a bit surprising—and as noted
above, the distinction between wak and hok might not withstand closer scrutiny, as suggested by some of
the findings reported in Keenan et al. (2013). Still, if the distinction is confirmed, one should try to
understand why distinct calls serve roughly the same function. One tantalizing possibility is that in earlier
times wak referred to a now extinct aerial predator, which would explain its current similarity with hok.
50 It must be added, however, that our (pragmatic) theory posits no analytic connection between the
effect of the alarm parameter and the lexical content of R-oo. In fact, the meaning we derived in (51)a,
copied in (i), should in principle be compatible with a high alarm parameter: krak-oo characterizes the
nature of the disturbance, while the alarm parameter might characterize how urgent the threat is, as we
noted at the beginning of Sect. 3.1 (following Lemasson et al. 2010). For instance, it could be that a tree
fall isn’t a strong disturbance, but that one needs to react to it rather urgently. Still, the interaction
between -oo and the alarm parameter is in need of further elucidation.
(i) IM,s,t(krak–oo) = 1 iff a at time t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance that isn’t strong among all
disturbances.
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8.2.2 Extensions
– We only discussed male alarm calls, which have the advantage of being easy for
researchers to perceive and record. But females have their own repertoire of alarm
calls, whose semantics should be studied formally; and its (phonological and
semantic) correspondence with male calls should be investigated as well (see for
instance Ouattara et al. 2009c; Lemasson et al. 2003, 2011a, b; Lemasson and
Hausberger 2011).
– While we primarily focused on production data, we tacitly assumed that the
‘theory of truth’ applicable to producers of calls is also relevant for receivers; if
needed, this hypothesis could be relaxed in future research.51
– Finally, it should be clear that the methods used in the present piece—which are
in the end standard methods of formal semantics—could be applied to any
number of other instances of primate and non-primate calls (or for that matter
communicative gestures).
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Appendix: An analysis with pragmatic strengthening and no time dependency
The pragmatic analysis developed in Sect. 6 was based on the idea that krak is in
competition with krak-oo and hok (as well as hok-oo), which lead to a strengthened
meaning for krak equivalent to krak and not krak-oo and not hok, with the rough
meaning the caller is alert to a terrestrial disturbance which is serious among all
disturbances. The key idea was that this strengthening is useful in Tai and primarily
singles out ground predators, whereas it is contradictory or near-contradictory on
Tiwai (for lack of serious ground threats). But for the theory to work, it was crucial
that krak-oo should be more informative than krak; thus we postulated that -oo was
an attenuative suffix, with R-oo meaning roughly: the caller is alert to a disturbance
that isn’t strong among those that license R. This, in turn, led to difficulties for
sequences that are indicative of a serious threat (e.g. of an eagle presence), while
still containing some instances of krak-oo, which has the entailment that the threat is
not serious. Our solution was to relativize meanings to the precise time and state of
mind of the caller, with the assumption that a monkey alert to a given threat may go
through phases of less intense alarm than is licensed by the threat. By contrast, in
51 One possible confusion should be avoided. Even though our data pertained to call production, our
theory of truth takes the usual form, i.e. Sentence S is true if and only ____. This is not a theory of
production, which should take the form Sentence S is produced if (and only if) _______. For instance, our
two theories both treat krak-oo as a call which is true when any disturbance arises; but from this it does
not follow that we predict that krak-oo must be produced in all such cases—this result could follow from a
theory of production but not from a theory of truth alone.
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the lexicalist analysis developed in Sect. 5, R-oo had a meaning that was logically
weaker than that of R: R-oo roughly meant that there is a disturbance that licenses
the same attentional state as R. Thus if hok means that there is an aerial predator,
hok-oo meant that one should be in the same attentional state as if there were an
aerial predator, with no commitment that there is indeed one—thus one might look
up without necessarily being alarmed. For this reason, the lexical meaning of krak-
oo was entirely non-specific, and in particular it was not restricted to weak
disturbances; this, in turn, avoided the problem of ‘time inconsistency’ we got in the
second analysis—and hence there was no need to relativize calls to the very
millisecond at which they were uttered.
Can we combine the benefits of both analyses? Let us consider the lexical
entailments that are plausibly given by our first analysis when we restrict attention
to the innate (unspecific) meaning of krak, as represented in (62).
(62) Lexical entailments
krak
krak-oo
hok
hok-oo
Since in that initial analysis R-oo has a broader range of uses than R, krak entails
krak-oo and hok entails hok-oo. Furthermore, since the analysis was designed to
explain why the innate (unspecific) meaning of krak (obtained on Tiwai) has a
completely general use, it is plausible that hok entails krak. For the moment, we
leave open whether hok-oo entails krak-oo (we will argue shortly that it should not).
The strengthened meanings we get from (62) with the full lines are given in (63);
the rough paraphrases we provide are just initial approximations, as the details
depend on the precise lexical entries we will posit.52
52 An alternative research direction would be to appeal to ‘higher-order implicatures’ (as in Spector
2007) and to posit that krak competes with the strengthened meaning of krak-oo, with the latter meaning
‘there is a weak threat’. The difficulty is that with the lexical entailments in (62) (including the dotted
line), the strengthened meaning krak-oo of krak-oo would be something like krak-oo and not krak and not
hok-oo; and the strengthened meaning of krak with that competitor taken into account would yield krak
and not hok and not [krak-oo and not krak and not hok-oo]. But the conjunct in bold simplifies to [(not
krak-oo) or krak or hok-oo], and due to the disjunct krak it turns out to be entirely redundant. [For
comparison, in Spector 2007 plurals turned out to have a very weak (‘at least one’) semantics, but the
sentence Jack saw horses turned out to have a strengthened meaning of at least two horses because the
plural horses competed with the strengthened meaning of a horse. Crucially, however, a horse competed
with two horses, as represented below:
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(63) On the assumption that the entailment relations represented by the full
lines in (62) are the only ones that hold among {krak, krak-oo, hok,
hok-oo}, the strengthened meanings of these calls are:
for every model M and situation s,
a. [[krak-oo]] M, s = 1 iff [[krak-oo]] M, s = 1 and [[krak]] M, s = 0
and [[hok]] M, s = 0
b. [[hok-oo]] M, s = 1 iff [[hok-oo]] M, s, t = 1 and [[hok]] M, s = 0
c. [[krak]] M, s = 1 iff [[krak]] M, s = 1 and [[hok]] M, s = 0
d. [[hok]] M, s = 1 iff [[hok]] M, s = 1
Now we could try to emulate the results of our second (pragmatics-based) analysis
by arguing in three steps.
Step 1 krak is specified for a relatively high level of alarm (while hok, as before,
refers to disturbances whose source is aerial).
Step 2 The strengthened meaning of krak, krak, naturally refers to serious non-
aerial threats in Tai, namely to leopards.
Step 3 For lack of serious non-aerial threats on Tiwai, the strengthened meaning
is never used, and only unstrengthened krak occurs.
But this doesn’t quite work. The problem lies in Step 1: in our data, krak is used
for all disturbances on Tiwai, including ones (e.g. tree falls) which don’t seem to be
particularly severe. So for this analysis to work, we must modify Step 1 and assume
that there are two sources of environment-dependency in the semantics, rather than
just one.
(i) As before, strengthened meanings are avoided when they yield contradictions
relative to the environment—hence a first source of environment dependency.
(ii) In addition, we must assume that (a) krak means something like: there is a
threat of at least average intensity given the environment, and that (b) the
general level of threat is lower on Tiwai than in Tai (among others due to the
absence of ground predators)—hence a second level of environment
dependency.
Thus Step 1 is replaced with Step 10, stated informally as follows:
Step 1’. krak uttered in environment M means that there is a threat of at least
average intensity given M. Threat levels are lower on Tiwai than in Tai, and
Footnote 52 continued
As a result, the strengthened meaning of horses meant something like: at least one horse and not a horse,
hence: at least one horse and not exactly one horse. We do not have enough alternatives to provide such
an analysis in (62), at least not without more sophisticated mechanisms.]
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hence the lexical (unstrengthened) meaning of krak has a broader range of uses on
Tiwai than in Tai.
With this modified analysis, we can almost derive the results we want:
– In Tai, the strengthened meaning of krak, namely krak, refers by (63)c to threats
of at least average intensity relative to Tai, but only ones to which hok cannot
apply; hence roughly: to threats of average intensity whose source isn’t aerial (or
more rigorously: whose source isn’t an aerial threat of at least average intensity
relative to Tai). This naturally singles out leopards, at least in most cases.
– On Tiwai, for lack of threats whose source is terrestrial, strengthening fails to
apply, and krak is used with its lexical (unstrengthened) meaning; it thus refers
to threats of at least average intensity relative to Tiwai. Since the general level
of threat is lower on Tiwai than in Tai, krak gets applied to threats such as
falling trees to which krak wouldn’t be applied in Tai (even on its
unstrengthened meaning).
But there remain two problems.
1. First, the distribution of krak in Tai can only be explained if strengthening to
krak (which entails not hok) is applied in most cases—for otherwise we would
predict many instances of krak in all eagle-related contexts, which we don’t
find. But if krak is strengthened to krak (when the result isn’t contradictory), we
would expect that in roughly the same proportion krak-oo should be
strengthened to krak-oo, which entails not krak. Without additional assump-
tions, this might predict that in most cases krak-oo is used for threats of less
than average level—which doesn’t appear to be correct, since krak-oo appears
in virtually all contexts, including ones that involve leopard growls or eagle
shrieks. A natural solution would be to take into account the early parts of a
sequence when determining whether strengthening is or isn’t contradictory. The
idea would be that when krak-oo follows a series of krak’s or a series of hok’s,
strengthening to krak-oo is blocked because it yields a contradiction relative to
that sequence. The repercussions of this measure would need to be investigated,
however. In particular, one should ask why the same measure wouldn’t predict
that krak can occur in high numbers in non-leopard-related sequences in Tai, as
long as it follows a series of hok’s, for instance.
2. Second, we must also ensure that krak-oo is not strengthened in such a way that
it entails not hok-oo, for krak-oo seems to be used for threats that are aerial as
well as non-terrestrial. We might view this as another instance of the first
problem mentioned in the preceding paragraph—maybe we just need to find a
way to block strengthening of krak-oo. Alternatively, we might set up the
semantics in such a way that hok-oo doesn’t entail krak-oo—despite the fact
that krak entails hok. This is achieved in the lexical entries we now turn to.
To make the proposed analysis concrete, we define some possible lexical entries
for a system which does not have the fine-grained time dependency we had in our
‘official’ model (‘one call per time unit’).
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(64) Lexical Semantics
For any model M and situation s
-Roots
a. IM, s(krak) = 1 iff in s there is a disturbance of at least average intensity
given the environment M
b. IM, s(hok) = 1 iff in s there is a disturbance of at least average intensity
given the environment M and its source is terrestrial
c. IM, s(boom-boom) = 1 iff in s there is a disturbance but no predator
-Affix
d. for any root R,
IM,s(R–oo) = 1 iff IM,s(R) = 1 or one should be in the same attentional state
as for a prototypical threat licensing (unstrengthened) R in M.
It is immediate given (64)a-b that hok entails krak, as represented in (62).
Furthermore, given (64)d hok and krak entail hok-oo and krak-oo respectively, since
the latter two are weakenings (by way of disjunctions) of the corresponding roots.
Finally, the same rule is compatible with a situation in which hok-oo does not entail
krak-oo: the attentional state for a prototypical threat licensing hok might be to look
up (for an eagle); whereas the attentional state for a protypical threat licensing
(unstrengthened) krak might be to look around (because unstrengthened krak might
be used for all sorts of general threats). In this way, we obtain the entailments in
(62) represented by the full lines only.
While this model does without fine-grained time dependency, it requires non-
trivial assumptions and leaves some problems open—notably the issue of how to
block a strengthening of krak-oo that would entail not krak.
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